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Abstract
In the first part of this thesis, we study the application of a clearing mechanism of a financial
network to a specific type of financial network, which is established upon an abstract underlying
asset. In particular, we focus on the stability of the network against the fluctuation of underlying
market, which is measured by default threshold sequence. We also consider the behavior of this
sequence with some perturbation to configuration of the network itself. We will prove the continuity
of the sequence, based upon which we will take a look at the aspect of large deviation principle of
the sequence with appropriate random settings.
In the second part, we also consider an operation, called novation, which changes the topology
of a financial network and hence its stability. However, the stability in this case is measured by the
exposure to the central counterparty, which novates trades between members in the network. We
will see how the stability is related to two important characteristics of a novation structure, tiering
and concentration.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
A significant characteristic of modern financial activity is the complexity of interconnectedness
among participants: in a financial market, they form a web, with financial contracts or other
counterparts playing the role of edges which connect them. Just like a spider web, a vibration
at some point on this web can spread to somewhere else along some path or in some pattern,
depending upon the infrastructure of this web.
The interest in financial networks naturally arises as the complexity of financial activities is
growing rapidly. A great number of financial tools are designed for participants with various pur-
poses; these get involved in different constituents of portfolios that further cause financial obligations
due to the frequent fluctuation of the underlying market. Hence natural questions are assessing
the risk of the network, assessing its resilience to market perturbation and characterizing network
collapses and their effects.
If the market is shocked by an unexpected sudden perturbation, such as a sudden slump in the
price of the underling asset, the induced financial obligation of some participant might exceed the
limit of its ability to pay and it would then default. If this participant is not a vital node in the
network, the effect could possibly be absorbed before a severe crisis appears to other members;
however, if it has a big weight in the network, a contagion of bankruptcy would occur and the
structure of the network could be significantly impacted in a large scale. In chapter 2, a measure,
called default threshold sequence, will be introduced to give a description of how the financial
network is faced up with market fluctuation, with a specific mechanism for clearing the financial
liabilities induced by market fluctuation.
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Besides, the stability of a financial network is also highly related to its topology, if we keep some
configuration fixed. The topology here refers to a novation pattern, which reallocates the financial
exposures among the participants. The financial exposures are abstract financial objects, which
can be regarded as a kind of financial risk; roughly speaking, the higher the exposure is, the more
risks it would face. Some authors use the expected exposure as the measure of risk, with some
assumption of randomness. In chapter 4 we will consider the extreme case that could occur, that
is, the events that a very high level of exposure occurs. Hence, it is natural to take into account
the probability of such events, and to see how it depends upon the characteristics of the novation
pattern.
1.2 Mathematical Model
We first give a strict definition of the object we are studying. A financial market must have finitely
many participants, and there are financial obligations binding them. Besides, in most cases each
participant is required to guarantee the capital in order to fulfill its liability if the obligation reaches
maturity. Thus we can embed the three factors into a graph model together with a vector.
Definition 1.2.1. A financial network is a triple (V ,L,e), where V is a finite set, the elements of
which are indexed by 1, 2, . . . , N = |V |, L is a N×N matrix with zeros on diagonal and non-negative
off-diagonals, and e is an N × 1 vector with non-negative entries.
In a financial network (V,L, e), Lij denotes the volume of the financial obligation of i to j, or
the amount i owes j. In reality, it is the number of contracts from i to j, which can be simply cash
or some derivatives such as a position in future market. The common thing is that i must fulfill
the contracts when they mature. The vector e is understood as the endowment or cash account of
these participants, and it is used as one source of capital to fulfill financial obligations. Besides,
each participant can also use the money it receives from the others to pay its own debts and there
is no other way that one can collect money. The question is how to assign everyone’s capital in
order that its financial obligations are cleared in a reasonable way.
If the amount of the capital collected exceeds that of obligations, there is definitely no contro-
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versy since every debt would be completely cleared; however, if one does not have enough capital
to clear all its debts, some decision must be made, and this can lead to completely different results.
Indeed, this node might not be in such a big trouble that it is able to clear its obligations to most of
its creditors; in this case, if it chooses to clear the obligations to those node which has a high weight
in the whole network, the contagion of default can be under control in a relatively lower level, since
the nodes that play a role as stabilizer on the network are in a safe situation. This scheme looks a
good way in the sense of guaranteeing the integrity of the financial network, but it still confronts
two major issues: firstly, it may neglect the privilege of the nodes with smaller weight, which does
not seem that reasonable due to the lack of fairness; secondly, the determination of weight of each
node cannot be done in a convincing way, since ranking a node in a network usually meets the
difficulty of inconsistency, either global or local. See Jiang, Lim, Yao & Ye (2011).
Hence in this paper we adapt the scheme stated in Eisenberg & Noe (2011), which solves the
issue of fairness and does not depend on any assigned prior weight function to nodes. The advantage
of this scheme is that a clearing payment vector, formed by the payments of each node, can be
calculated by an algorithm with time cost O(N), where N is the cardinality of V as before. We
abbreviate this scheme as EN-scheme, after the authors of that paper. For completeness, we will
state the essentials of this scheme in section 1.3. For details refer to Eisenberg & Noe (2011).
1.3 Eisenberg-Noe Scheme
The Eisenberg-Noe clearing scheme is established upon three principles: limited liability, absolute
priority and proportionality. The limited liability is a natural assumption since any node does
not have to pay more than it owns. The absolute priority states that a node must clear all its
obligations before it can retain any cash for its own good. The proportionality states that the any
node should treat its creditors with the same priority, that is to say, the amount it pays to node
A should be proportional to the amount it owes to A. In order to formulate these principles, let’s
first introduce some notation.
Definition 1.3.1. Given a financial network (V,L, e), the nominal obligation vector is of the size
N = |V | whose i-th component p¯i is
∑
j∈V Lij; the relative liability matrix Π is of size N×N whose
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(i, j)-entry is Lij/p¯i if p¯i > 0 and 0 if otherwise:
Πij =

L(i,j)
p¯i
if p¯i > 0;
0 if p¯i = 0.
Let p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) be the payment vector, among which pi denotes the payment made by
node i. Since we assume the same priority of all the nodes, the payment from i to j is always piΠij .
Hence the payment received by i is
∑
j Π
T
ijpj where the Π
T is the transpose of Π.
Now let’s introduce the concept of clearing payment vector.
Definition 1.3.2. The clearing payment vector is a payment vector p∗which is subject to limited
liability and absolute priority:
• limited liability: p∗i ≤
∑
j Π
T
ijp
∗
j + ei;
• absolute priority: p∗ = p¯ or p∗ = ∑j ΠTijp∗j + ei; that is, one either clears all its obligations
or pays everything it owns.
It easily follows from the definition of clearing payment vector that the clearing payment vector
is a fixed point to the map Φ : [0, p¯]← [0, p¯] where
Φ(p) = (ΠT p+ e) ∧ p¯.
The map Φ is monotone; that is, p ≤ q implies Φ(p) ≤ Φ(q), here ≤ meaning that p ≤ q if
and only if each component of p does not exceed the corresponding component of q. Furthermore,
Φ(0) ≥ 0 and Φ(p¯) ≤ p¯, so by Tarski’s fixed-point theorem(see appendix A) Φ admits a non-empty
set consisting of its fixed-points. Though the uniqueness of clearing payment vector cannot be
guaranteed in general case(see Eisenberg & Noe (2011)), we can still ignore this ”imperfection”
since every clearing payment gives exactly the same terminal net value. Here the terminal net
value is given by
wi = ((Π
T p∗)i + ei − p¯i)+,
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which is the value remaining after the obligations cleared. In particular, if wi = 0 for some i ∈ V ,
then we say node i defaults. Generally, the term ”default” is used when one fails to fulfill full
obligations; however, in our set-up, the event wi = 0 includes not only this case, but also the
possibility that node i receives exactly the same amount as its nominal obligations. For simplicity,
we regard both cases as default.
1.4 Clearing and Netting
In a financial network there is possibility that there are bilateral liability between a pair of nodes,
that is, they owe to each other. An interesting question is about the difference between the clearing
of the original network and that of a netted one. By saying ”netting a liability matrix”, we refer to
simplifying the network in the way that L˜ij = (Lij − Lji)+. So the L˜ij denotes the netted liability
between i and j. We can definitely apply Eisenberg-Noe scheme to the new liability matrix and
then compare the result against the old one. It is expected that this operation should somehow
ease the potential trouble a generic node is faced up with, since it assumes one direction of liability
is fully cleared and also reduces the volume of the other. However, we will see in the following
examples that this guess is not always true. Moreover, such an operation could completely change
the case: a healthy node could fall sick, while a node in trouble could regain solvency after the
operation.
Example 1.4.1. A node that defaults with original liability would clear all its obligations if the
liability matrix were netted. This example(See figure 1.1) can be constructed easily. Assume a
network with node A, B and C, and let
L =

0 0 0
5 0 1
0 3 0
 , e =

1
1
2
 .
For node B, its total liability is 5 + 1 = 6, but its solvency is at most 3 + 1 = 4, which is strictly
smaller. Hence B defaults with this set-up. This default furthers causes C to default, since it can
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receive less than 1, which is not large enough to cover the gap between its endowment 2 and its
liability 3.
A
B C
5
1
3
A
B C
5
2
1
1 2
1
1 2
Figure 1.1: Example of a node that defaults with original liability but survives with liability netted
If we instead netted the matrix, and then the new liability matrix L˜ would be
L˜ =

0 0 0
5 0 0
0 2 0
 .
Now C has still 2 as endowment but only needs to pay 2 as liability, so it does not default.
Intuitively, netting liability could reduce everyone’s liability, so we expect that every node could
be of enough solvency after this operation. However, the cash flow through the edges would be
reallocated as the liability matrix is netted. Thus it is possible that the a node survives in the
original cash flow but would be dead if we netted the liability. See the example below.
Example 1.4.2. A node that is able to pay its obligations would be trapped in insolvency if the
liability matrix is netted. Let consider a network(See figure 1.2) with four nodes A, B, C and D
and liability matrix and endowment vector as follows:
L =

0 4 0 0
0 0 10 0
5 0 0 22.5
0 0 7.5 0

, e =

1
3
2
10

.
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If we apply the Eisenberg-Noe scheme, we see that p∗ = (4, 7, 16.5, 7.5)T and A is able to clear all
A
B C
D
4
10
5 22.5 7.5
A
B C
D
4
10
5 15
1
3 2
10 1 10
3 2
Figure 1.2: Example of a node that survives with original liability but defaults with liability netted
its liability. If we netted the liability matrix, L˜ would be
L˜ =

0 4 0 0
0 0 10 0
5 0 0 15
0 0 0 0

,
and the clearing payment vector would be (3, 6, 8, 0)T , implying the insolvency of A. To be more
detailed, with the original set-up, node C pays 527.5 × 16.5 = 3 to node A, which meets exactly the
amount A needs to pay off its debt; with the liability netted, node C pays instead 520 × 8 to node A,
which cannot cover the gap.
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Chapter 2
Network Stability
In this chapter we consider the stability of a kind of financial network. For this kind of network,
the liability results from the change in price of some underlying asset, such as stock, stock index,
or commodity. A participant, say A, who is in long position to another trader, say B, would have
to pay to B if the price of the underlying asset decreased in a period, while might get paid by B
if the price increased in another period. Thus the liability is determined by a position matrix P ,
recording the position taken between any two pair of nodes, and a single parameter δ, denoting the
change in price.
Let’s consider a concrete example, say a future market of crude oil. If A longs P units of
contracts to B, which mature at some date T . During any trade period I before T , the spot price
of crude oil fluctuates and thus there is cash flow between A and B: if the price increases by δ > 0,
then B needs to pay A δP dollars, that is, the liability from B to A is δP ; if the price goes down by
−δ < 0 instead, then A has a liability to B worth −δP dollars. Then the induced liability matrix
Lδ in any trade period is in form of Lδ(i, j) = Pijδ
− + Pjiδ+ for change of price δ.
We will only consider the case of positive δ, since it is similar to analyze the case of negative δ.
For simplicity, we will denote the family of financial networks {(V,Lδ, e)} by {(Pδ def= δP, e)}, and
denote |V | by N . A natural question is how the default pattern changes as δ increases. Intuitively,
the number of nodes that default should also increase, since everyone’s liability increases while its
endowment remains. We will see more detail in section 2.1.
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2.1 Default Threshold Sequence
For the network (Pδ, e), a clearing payment vector p
∗ is a vector satisfying that
p∗ = (ΠT p∗ + e) ∧ (δp¯),
where Π is the relative position matrix and p¯ is the nominal liability vector, both determined by
P . Dividing both sides by δ, we obtain that
p∗/δ = (ΠT (p∗/δ) + e/δ) ∧ p¯,
which implies that p∗/δ is a clearing payment vector to the network (P, e/δ). Furthermore, these
two networks have the same set of nodes that default, and hence we can equivalently study the
new network (P, e/δ) by enlarging δ. More generally, we can compare two networks (P, e1) and
(P, e2) with e1 ≤ e2 componentwise. An important property about the comparison is given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.1. Denote by D(e) the set of nodes that default in network (P, e), then e1 ≤ e2 implies
D(e2) ⊆ D(e1).
Proof. Denote by Φi the map associated with network (P, ei) respectively and define Di as {q ∈
[0, p¯] : q ≤ Φ(q)}. Referring to the proof the Tarski’s fixed point theorem in appendix A, we can
set the clearing payment vector p∗i of (P, ei) to
∨
Di. Since e1 ≤ e2, Φ1(q) ≤ Φ2(q) for all q. In
particular, p∗1 = Φ1(p∗1) ≤ Φ2(p∗1). Thus p∗1 ∈ D2, implying that p∗1 ≤ p∗2. Since ΠT is a non-negative
matrix, ΠT p∗1 ≤ ΠT p∗2 and hence ΠT p∗1 + e1 ≤ ΠT p∗2 + e2. Therefore w(1)k = (ΠT p∗1 + e1 − p¯k)+ ≤
(ΠT p∗2 + e2 − p¯k)+ = w(2)k , so if k defaults in (P, e1), then it also defaults in (P, e2).
We see from lemma 2.1.1 that as δ increases, the set of nodes that default also becomes bigger.
However, it cannot be the whole set, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.2. If e is not zero vector, then at least one node has positive terminal value.
Proof. Suppose that (ΠT p∗+ e)i ≤ p¯i for all i ∈ V . Hence we have p∗ = (ΠT p∗+ e)∧ p¯ = ΠT p∗+ e.
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Let α be the vector whose i-th component is 1 if and only if p¯i > 0. Then we have that Π
Tα = α.
So αTΠT = αT and hence αT p∗ = αT p∗+αT e, from which we obtain that αT e = 0; besides, p¯k = 0
implies that ek = 0 and hence
∑
i ei = 0, a contradiction to the assumption that e is not zero.
Now let’s introduce the concept of default threshold sequence. We consider the percentage of
defaulting participants under a given level of δ, defined in the way
r(δ) =
|{i ∈ V : (ΠT p∗ + e)i ≤ p¯i}|
N
,
where p∗ is a clearing vector to the network (Pδ, e) and Π is the relative liability matrix. Properties
of r(·) is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1.3. r(·) is an increasing right-continuous function on R+. If e is strictly positive, then
r(·) vanishes near 0.
Proof. By lemma 2.1.1 it is easy to see that r(δ) is an increasing function. The fact that r(·) is
valued in the discrete set {i/N : 0 ≤ 0 ≤ N} results in that r(·) is actually a stepwise function.
Hence there are finitely many discontinuity points, and the right continuity follows immediately.
If e is strictly positive, then ei > p¯i =
∑
j Pijδ for δ small enough for all i ∈ V and therefore r(·)
vanishes near 0.
Let’s explain a bit about the discontinuity points of r(·). First consider the largest value of δ
such that r(δ) = 0. r(δ) = 0 means that p∗ = p¯, so ΠT p¯+ e ≥ p¯, which give that
e ≥ δ(P − P T )1. (2.1)
Conversely, if this inequality fails to hold for some δ, there must be a node that defaults, since it is
unable to clear all its obligations even if it could collect all its credits. So the critical value for r(δ)
to turn nonzero is the supreme of the solutions to inequality 2.1. If P is such that (P −P T )1 = 0,
then 2.1 holds for all δ ∈ R+. So in sense of Eisenberg-Noe scheme, this kind of network is always
healthy; every node could clear its obligations since the amount of debts and credits are equal.
Otherwise, the set M def= {i ∈ V : ((P − P T )1)i > 0} is not empty, and it is straightforward to see
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that r(δ) = 0 if and only if δ > α, where
α
def
= min
i∈M
ei
((P − P T )1)i . (2.2)
At α, r(δ) is only left-continuous and it jumps to k/N for some k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Likewise, we
can continue find out the next jump point, and then look for the next. This procedure terminates
in finite steps, since there is only a finite number of nodes in the network. Since there is a new
node that defaults at every discontinuity of r(·), we introduce the following definition:
Definition 2.1.1. The default threshold sequence is the set of discontinuous points of r(·) sorted
in ascending order, denoted by {αi}si=1. Similarly, we can also define the default threshold sequence
for negative δ, denoted by {βi}ti=1, with βi descending as i grows.
The concept of default threshold sequence is pertained to the network, but lack of information
of the default threshold of each individual. Thus we introduce another concept which emphasizes
on this aspect.
Definition 2.1.2. Individual default threshold is the function α from {1, 2, . . . , N} to extended real
numbers, where
α(i)
def
= inf{δ : i defaults in (Pδ, e)}.
As usual, the infimum of empty set is∞, and α(i) =∞ says that node i never defaults. The next
question is about how to calculate default threshold sequence and individual default thresholds.
The algorithm is given in the next section.
2.1.1 Algorithm
In this section, we discuss the algorithm of finding the default threshold sequence. Again by
symmetry, we only consider the case of positive δ. For a financial network (Pδ, e), the clearing
payment vector p∗ is a vector p∗such that
p∗ = (ΠT p∗ + e) ∧ p¯, (2.3)
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where Π is the relative liability matrix and p¯ is the nominal liability.
If every node fully fulfills its obligation, the p∗ would simply be p¯ = Pδ1, and ΠT p∗ would
actually be P Tδ 1. Thus, the first threshold level α1 has to be the largest number such that
Pδ1 = (P
T
δ 1 + e) ∧ Pδ1;
or equivalently, e ≥ (Lδ − LTδ )1.
Next we should pin down the second threshold α2. Unlike the case for determining α1, for any
δ between α1 and α2, there is some node failing to pay obligation in full. In this case we denote
by D1 the set consisting of nodes that default and by N1 its complement in V . Therefore, the
restriction of p∗ on D1 is equal to the restriction of ΠT p∗ + e on D1; equivalently it is
p∗|D1 = (ΠT p∗)|D1 + e|D1 ,
where u|I is a V -dimensional vector whose i-th component to ui if i ∈ I and is zero otherwise.
Moreover, there are two matrices M1 and M2 such that
p∗|D1 = M1(p∗|D1) +M2(p∗|N1) + e|D1 .
It is easy to see that both M1 and M2 are sub-blocks of Π
T : M1(i, j) = Π
T (i, j) if (i, j) ∈ D1×D1
and is zero otherwise, and M2(i, j) = Π
T (i, j) if (i, j) ∈ D1 ×N1 and is zero otherwise. Thus the
invertibility of I −M1 would allow us to solve p∗|D1 in terms of p∗|N1 . We claim in the following
lemma that with a very mild assumption this matrix is invertible.
Lemma 2.1.4. If e ∈ R++, i.e., ei > 0 for all i, then for any subset of V consisting of nodes that
default, say D, the restriction of ΠT on D × D, say M , has spectral radius smaller than 1 and
hence I −M is invertible.
Proof. Instead, we consider the transpose of M , since they have exactly the same spectrum. Sup-
pose that λ is an eigenvalue of MT and u is an associated eigenvector. Assume that |λ| = 1 and
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u(k) = supi∈V |u(i)| > 0 for the k-th component of u. Define J (k) as follows:
J (k) = {j ∈ D : (MT )nk,j > 0, for some n ∈ N}.
Since λu(k) =
∑
j 6=k(M
T )kju
(j), we have that
0 < |u(k)| = |
∑
j 6=k
(MT )kju
(j)| ≤
∑
j 6=k
(MT )kj |u(j)|
≤
∑
j 6=k
(MT )kj |u(k)| ≤ |u(k)|.
The last inequality follows the fact that MT is a sub-block of a stochastic matrix. Let Jk be
{k}⋃J (k).Hence for each j such that (MT )kj > 0, we have |u(j)| = |u(k)| and ∑j 6=k(MT )kj = 1.
If we mimicked the procedure, we would see that for each j ∈ Jk, the sum of j-th row of MT
is 1. Therefore Jk itself forms a closed system with strictly positive endowment. This shows that
at least one participant does not default, which is a contradiction to the prior assumption that D
is the set of participants that default.
Thus, the spectral radius of M is smaller than 1 and the invertibility of I −M follows immedi-
ately.
Since I −MD1 is invertible, we have that
p∗|D1 = (I −M1)−1M2p∗|N1 + (I −M1)−1e|D1 .
Substituting p∗|D1 by the right-hand-side of the equality above into the equation 2.3 and focusing
on indices in N1, we get that
p∗|N1 = (M˜p∗|N1 + η) ∧ p¯|N1 , (2.4)
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where
M˜ = M3((I −M1)−1M2 + I), (2.5)
η = M3(I −M1)−1e|D1 + e|N1 (2.6)
M3 = Π
T −M1 −M2. (2.7)
Also, M3 can be regarded as a sub-block of Π
T : M3(i, j) = Π
T (i, j) if i ∈ N1 and zero otherwise.
Note that this is a system of the same form as that of equation 2.3. Thus α2 would be simply the
largest number δ such that p∗|N1 = p¯|N1 is the solution to the above equation. Then we can iterate
the above procedure till some k such that αk is ∞. We summarize the procedure as the algorithm
below:
Step 1: Set M to ΠT , D to ∅ and η to e;
Step 2: Consider the system p|Dc = (Mp|Dc + η) ∧ p¯|Dc ;
Step 3: Determine the largest δ such that p = p¯|Dc solves the equation in step 2, denoted by A. There
are two cases: if A <∞, this A is the value of the next default threshold and should be added
in; if A =∞,this means that no new node would default no matter how large δ becomes, so
terminate the procedure;
Step 4 Set D to the set {i ∈ V : (ΠT p∗ + e)i ≤ p¯i} at δ = A and set M and η in the following way:
M and η is the combination such that
p∗|Dc = (Mp∗|Dc + η) ∧ p¯|Dc ,
The existence of M and η are guaranteed by lemma 2.1.4, as determined in equations (2.4).
Then go back to step 2.
Now let’s take a look at the concrete example below.
Example 2.1.1. Suppose that the liability matrix is
14
Pδ =

N1 N2 N3 N4
N1 0 2δ 0 δ
N2 0 0 3δ 0
N3 δ 0 0 5δ
N4 0 δ 0 0

,
Hence the relative liability matrix Π is
Π =

N1 N2 N3 N4
N1 0 2/3 0 1/3
N2 0 0 1 0
N3 1/6 0 0 5/6
N4 0 1 0 0

.
Then suppose that the endowment vector is
e =

3
4
2
5

.
Now let’s start the procedure. First we set M0, D0 and η0 to be Π
T , ∅ and e respectively. Then
p|Dc is just p. If p¯ solves the nonlinear system, we must have
p¯ ≤M0p¯+ η0 = ΠT p¯+ e,
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which turns out to be 
3δ
3δ
6δ
δ

≤

δ
3δ
3δ
6δ

+

3
4
2
5

.
It is quick to see that α1 = 2/3, where only node 3 reaches its threshold. So D1 = {N3}. To
determine M1 and η1, we first need to represent p3 in terms of p1, p2 and p4. This is obviously
attained by extracting the third row of the vector M0p+η0, which is p2 +2. Putting back p3 = p2 +2
into M0p+ η2 and eliminating the third row, we obtain that
M1p|Dc1 + η1 =

0 1/6 0
2/3 0 1
1/3 5/6 0
 p|Dc1 +

10/3
4
2/3
 .
Again, if p¯|Dc1 solves the nonlinear system p|Dc1 = (M1p|Dc1 + η1) ∧ p¯|Dc1, we need to solve
3δ
3δ
δ
 ≤

1/2δ
3δ
7/2δ
+

10/3
4
20/3
 .
Then it turns out that α2 = 4/3, where only N1 reaches its threshold. Thus D2 = {N1, N3}.
Similarly, let’s put back p1 = 1/6p2 + 10/3 into M1p|Dc1 + η1. We see that it becomes
M2p|Dc2 + η2 =
1/9 1
8/9 0
 p|Dc2 +
56/9
70/9
 .
If p¯|Dc2 solves the nonlinear system, we should have3δ
δ
 ≤
4/3δ
8/3δ
+
56/9
70/9
 .
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Further, we get that A3 = 56/15, where only N2 reaches its threshold, and thus D3 = {N1, N2, N3}.
Though it seems that the algorithm should be carried on, since the A in the last step is still finite,
we can actually stop here, because in a network with 4 traders at most 3 traders can default no
matter how the liability changes.
As a result, we get a threshold series α1 = 2/3, α2 = 4/3 and α3 = 56/15, and a defaulting set
series D1 = {N3}, D2 = {N1, N3} and D3 = {N1, N2, N3}. The clearing payment with δ ranging
over R+ is listed below:
• 0 < δ ≤ 2/3: p∗ = (3δ, 3δ, 6δ, δ)T and D = ∅;
• 2/3 < δ ≤ 4/3: p∗ = (3δ, 3δ, 3δ + 2, δ)T and D = {3};
• 4/3 < δ ≤ 56/15: p∗ = (δ/2 + 10/3, 3δ, 3δ + 2, δ)T and D = {1, 3};
• 56/15 < δ: p∗ = (δ/2 + 10/3, 4δ/3 + 56/9, 3δ + 2, δ)T and D = {1, 2, 3}
Moreover, we visualize the default patterns in this example in figure 2.1, in which dashed lines
indicate nominal obligations and solid lines indicate defaults at corresponding levels of δ.
2.1.2 The Largest Default Threshold
Sometime we are more interested in the worst situation that a network could confront. In our
model, the worst case refers to that the price change of the underlying asset is extremely large in
magnitude during a single period. Indeed, a sharp change in price could cause some participants
to get in big trouble in paying a huge amount of induced obligations. So a natural question is to
determine the smallest level of price change beyond which no new default could occur. In other
words, we want to know more about
αmax
def
= sup{αm : αm <∞}
and
βmin
def
= inf{βm : βm > −∞}
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Figure 2.1: Default Chain at different levels of δ. A: 0 < δ ≤ 2/3; B: 2/3 < δ ≤ 4/3; C:
4/3 < δ ≤ 56/15; D: 56/15 < δ. Dashed arrows mean that the obligation is completely cleared and
solid arrows means that this obligation is not completely cleared, both under the current level of δ.
Our basic idea is to first find out which traders default when the worst case occurs, and then to
find out the smallest δ such that this case occurs. As before, we still focus on the case of positive
δ.
Note that any fixed point of the above mapping is in form of δa(δ) + b(δ), where both a(δ) and
b(δ) are N×1 vectors, depending upon δ. Actually, both a(δ) and b(δ) are stepwise constant vector,
which says that they are constant between two neighboring default thresholds. This simple result
is drawn from the fact that the clearing payment of a node that does not default is a scalar of δ,
that of a node that defaults is a linear combination of payments of nodes that does not default plus
a constant and the default set is the same for different values of δ between two consecutive default
threshold levels. Based upon this fact, we see that once a participant, say i, defaults at some level
of δ0, the corresponding component of δ0a(δ0) + b(δ0) must satisfy that δ0a(δ0)i + ei < δp¯i, which
simply implies that a(δ0)i < p¯i. Hence this relation holds for any δ larger than δ0, by proposition
2.1.1. Thus, if δ is larger than the largest default threshold, a sufficient and necessary condition
for participant i to default is a(δ)i < p¯i. We should investigate more about the coefficient vector
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a(δ) for the worst case in order to find all the defaulting participants.
In Eisenberg & Noe (2011) it is also shown that a clearing payment vector is the limit of {p(n)},
where p(n+1)
def
= Φ(p(n)) with initial p(0) = p¯ = δP1. Hence, by setting δ to be large enough(larger
than the largest default threshold level), we claim that the coefficient vector a(δ) is the limit of the
sequence {ln}, defined inductively as follows:
l(n+1) = ΠT l(n) ∧ l(0) (2.8)
with l(0) = l¯ = P1.
In fact, we have a better result about the sequence l(n).
Lemma 2.1.5. Define
l(n+1) = ΠT l(n) ∧ l(n) (2.9)
with l(0) = l¯ = P1. Then a(δ) is the limit of l(n).
Proof. It holds for n = 0 obviously. For n = 1, we have that
ΠT l(1) ∧ l(0) = (ΠT l(1) ∧ΠT l(0)) ∧ l(0) = ΠT l(1) ∧ (ΠT l(0) ∧ l(0)) = ΠT l(1) ∧ l(1) = l(2),
where the first equality follows that l(1) ≤ l(0). Hence it also holds for n = 1. It is quick to check
this hold for every n by the same method.
Since {l(n)} is a decreasing sequence, which has a trivial lower bound 0. So they do converge
to a limit, say l∗, which satisfies that
l∗ = ΠT l∗ ∧ l∗. (2.10)
We then claim that l∗ = ΠT l∗. By the definition of the operation ∧, we have that l∗ ≤ ΠT l∗
and thus 1T l∗ ≤ 1TΠT l∗. However, we also have the equation 1T l∗ = 1TΠT l∗, based upon the
fact that 1 = 1ΠT if each component of l(0) is strictly positive and that l∗k = 0 if l
(0)
k = 0. Thus,
1T l∗ ≤ 1TΠT l∗ = 1T l∗, which indicates that l∗ = ΠT l∗. Hence, the limit l∗ is either an eigenvector
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of ΠT with respect to the eigenvalue 1 or zero vector.
So the next question is that how to know if l∗ is zero. Let’s first assume that the network (P, e)
is connected. Here connectedness means that for any pair (i, j) ∈ V × V , there is n ∈ N such
that Πnij > 0 or Π
n
ji > 0. This assumption makes sense since if a network has several connected
components, then there would be no cash flows between them and hence should be considered
independently. Here we reply more on Π by the simple reason that it can be regarded as a transition
matrix of a Markov chain. However, this Markov chain might have some absorbing states, the row
sums of which are zeros; in other words, they do not have any liability to other nodes, and therefore
they will never default.
If we assume the existence of absorbing state, then l∗ must be zero: it is obvious that the
component of l∗ with respect to absorbed state is zero; for a non-absorbing state, say k, note that
limn→∞((ΠT )nl(0))k = 0 and that l
(n)
k ≤ ((ΠT )nl(0))k. So the existence of absorbing state implies
l∗ is the zero vector. Conversely, if there is no absorbing state, then l(0) is strictly positive. We
also know that there is some node that does not default, if the endowment is strictly positive, then
there is some component, say k, such that l∗k = l
(0)
k > 0, implying that l
∗ is an eigenvector. Thus
we have
Lemma 2.1.6. In a network (P, e), if P is connected viewed as a undirected graph and e is strictly
positive, then l∗ = 0 if and only if P has zero row.
By Lemma 2.1.6, if there is no zero row in P then l∗ is an eigenvalue associated with 1. Since
there no absorbed states, there must be at least one communicating class associated with Π. Once
again, it is easy to see that for any transitive state, its value in l∗ is zero. Then we focus on
each sub-block of Π formed by a communicating class. By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem for an
irreducible non-negative matrix(see Seneta (1981)), the dimension of the eigenspace associated with
1 is one-dimensional, and we pick up such an eigenvector y. Notice that y cannot exceed l(0) and
that there must be some component on which these two vectors coincide. Therefore we select α > 0
such that αy ≤ l(0) on this communicating class and for some k in this class αyk = l(0)k , and the
restriction on this class is αy. For every communicating class we do the same thing and fill up an
empty V -dimensional vector with these αy’s in the corresponding positions; after that, we fill up
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the rest of the positions of the vector with 0, since they stand for the transitive states. Thus we
obtain l∗.
Let’s take a look at two examples which compare the iteration method and the eigenvector
method for finding the ”ultimate” default set D, the index subset {i ∈ V : l∗i < l¯i}..
Example 2.1.2. Let’s use the data of the previous example to see how the iteration works. Here
ΠT =

0 0 1/6 0
2/3 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1/3 0 5/6 0

and l(0) =

3
3
6
1

.
Then
l(1) = ΠT l(0) ∧ l(0)

1
3
3
6

∧

3
3
6
1

=

1
3
3
1

;
l(2) = ΠT l(1) ∧ l(1)

1/2
5/3
3
17/6

∧

1
3
3
1

=

1/2
5/3
3
1

;
l(3) = ΠT l(2) ∧ l(2)

1/2
4/3
5/3
8/3

∧

1/2
5/3
3
1

=

1/2
4/3
5/3
1

;
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l(4) = ΠT l(3) ∧ l(3)

5/18
4/3
4/3
14/9

∧

1/2
4/3
5/3
1

=

5/18
4/3
4/3
1

;
l(5) = ΠT l(4) ∧ l(4)

2/9
31/27
4/3
65/54

∧

5/18
4/3
4/3
1

=

2/9
31/27
4/3
1

;
l(6) = ΠT l(5) ∧ l(5)

2/9
31/27
4/3
32/27

∧

5/18
31/27
4/3
1

=

2/9
31/27
4/3
1

= l(5);
Thus the sequence stabilizes from the 6-th iteration. And it is direct to check that the limit is an
eigenvector of ΠT associated with 1. Since l∗ is smaller than l(0) at 1, 2 and 3, node 1, 2 and 3
default.
The example above shows that the iteration can terminate within finite steps with some set-up.
The next example shows that the iteration does not have to stop within finite steps, which implies
that sometimes it is better to directly find out the eigenvector for locating nodes that default.
Example 2.1.3. Consider a network with
Π =

0 1/2 0 1/2
1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

and l(0) =

1
1
1
1

.
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It is straightforward to check that
l(n) =

1/2n−1
1/2n−1
1
1

.
Hence the iteration will never stop. Obviously, the limit is
l∗ =

0
0
1
1

,
which is the base of the eigenspace of ΠT associated with 1. Therefore node 1 and 2 default.
This prior knowledge of D would help us greatly simplify the fixed point problem about the
map Φ(p) = p. For simplicity of narration, we first introduce an operation between two column
vectors. Define
u⊗ v def= (uivi)T .
Thus ⊗ means component-wise multiplication. More generally, u can be replaced with a matrix,
which is written in a column form; in this case, uivi is the scalar multiple of ui by vi.
Let 1D and 1N denote the indicator vectors of D and D
c respectively. Hence the equation
p∗ = (ΠT p∗ + e) ∧ δp¯ can be equivalently represented as
p∗ND = δp¯⊗ 1N ,
p∗D = (Π
T (p∗N + p
∗
D) + e)⊗ 1D,
where δ should be such that (ΠT (p∗N + p
∗
D) + e) ⊗ 1D ≤ δp¯ ⊗ 1D. From this inequality, we can
solve for the range of a such that the network falls in the worst situation. The infimum of the
admissible δ is then the largest default threshold. Let’s simplify the condition for δ. Inheriting the
terms mentioned in that section, we deal with the equation associated with p∗D. Substituting p
∗
N
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into this equation, we obtain that
p∗D = (Π
T (p∗N + p
∗
D) + e)⊗ 1D
= (ΠT (δp¯⊗ 1N + p∗D) + e)⊗ 1D
= (ΠT (δp¯⊗ 1N ))⊗ 1D + (ΠT p∗D)⊗ 1D + e⊗ 1D
= (ΠT ⊗ 1D)(δp¯⊗ 1N ) + (ΠT ⊗ 1D)p∗D + e⊗ 1D,
from which we further get that
(I −ΠT ⊗ 1D)p∗D = (ΠT ⊗ 1D)(δp¯⊗ 1N ) + e⊗ 1D.
If (I − ΠT ⊗ 1D) is invertible, then we can solve p∗D in terms of a, ΠT and e. However,
its invertibility is not obvious. Equivalently, we can instead consider the matrix ΠTD,D, which is
defined as the restriction of ΠT on row index D and column index D; symbolically,
ΠTD,D = ((Π
T ⊗ 1D)T ⊗ 1D)T = (Π⊗ 1D)T ⊗ 1D.
Indeed, (ΠT ⊗ 1D)p∗D = ΠTD,Dp∗D.
Therefore, we should only need the invertibility of I − ΠTD,D, which is guaranteed by lemma
2.1.4.
We then have that
p∗D = (I −ΠTD,D)−1(ΠT ⊗ 1D)(δp¯⊗ 1N ) + (I −ΠTD,D)−1(e⊗ 1D).
Recalling that p∗D ≤ δp¯⊗ 1D, we see that αmax is the smallest value of δ such that
(I −ΠTD,D)−1(e⊗ 1D) ≤ δ(p¯⊗ 1D − (I −ΠTD,D)−1(ΠT ⊗ 1D)(p¯⊗ 1ND)) (2.11)
Remark 2.1.7. The ultimate default set D is completely determined by the position matrix and is
independent of the endowment. Hence it is enough to know how the network is connected in order
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to predict that if a node would default. However, in the determination of the order of nodes that
default, the endowment gets involved in, as seen in the definition of the first default threshold.
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Chapter 3
Perturbation to Network
3.1 Perturbation to endowment
The default threshold sequence is determined by the position matrix P and the endowment vector
e. One question of interest is how this sequence would deviate if we changed the matrix or vector
a little. Let’s first see what happens if we change the endowment a little bit. From equations (2.2)
and (2.11), we see that the effect on the smallest default threshold α1 and the largest threshold
αmax brought by perturbation to endowment vector is straightforward to study. Roughly speaking,
if the perturbation to e is measured by , then the perturbations to α1 and αmax are also of order
of , with the position matrix fixed. Moreover, if we review the procedure of the algorithm which is
used to find out every term of default threshold sequence, we see that in each iteration both M and
η are dependent upon e continuously, and hence by the same argument the error of each perturbed
default threshold to its own original counterpart is of order  if we further assume the length of the
default threshold sequence is not changed.
Therefore if we randomize the endowment vector with a constant expectation and variance
shrinking to zero, the induced default threshold sequence tends to the one induced by the expec-
tation as the endowment in probability with a properly defined distance function. Moreover, we
are interested in how to measure the event that the perturbed default sequence deviates from the
original one, and this is the reason why we shall use tools of large deviation theories to quantify
that event.
For computability, we assume that each endowment ei is subject to log-normal distribution at
the very beginning; that is, ln ei ∼ N (µi, σ2). Furthermore, we assume that they are independent
of each other. We will see the asymptotic behavior of α1 and αmax as σ tends to zero.
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Example 3.1.1. Large Deviation Principle of α1. Recall that α1 is defined to be the largest positive
number δ such that e ≥ (Pδ − P Tδ )1; equivalently, this inequality can be written as e ≥ δu, where
u = (P − P T )1. Thus
α1 = min
{
ei
ui
: ui > 0
}
,
and assume that k is the index where α1 is attained. Therefore,
P{αα1 ≥ t} = P
{
ei
ui
≥ t for any ui > 0
}
=
∏
ui>0
P{ln ei ≥ ln (uit)}
=
∏
ui>0
∫ +∞
ln (uit)
1√
2piσ
exp
{
−(x− µi)
2
2σ2
}
dx.
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and multiplying them by σ2, we obtain that
σ2 lnP{ασ1 ≥ t} = σ2
∑
ui>0
ln
(∫ +∞
ln (uit)
1√
2piσ
exp
{
−(x− µi)
2
2σ2
})
= σ2|{i : ui > 0}| ln 1√
2piσ
+
∑
ui>0
σ2 ln
(∫ +∞
ln (uit)
exp
{
−(x− µi)
2
2σ2
})
→ −
∑
ui>0
inf
x≥ln (uit)
(x− µi)2
2
,
= − inf
x≥t
∑
i:ln(uix)>µi
(ln(uix)− µi)2
2
as σ goes to 0, by Laplace principle. In particular, if t > α1, then the rate is strictly negative, which
means that the probability P{ασ1 ≥ t} decays exponentially.
Now let’s take a look at the event α1 ≤ t. We have
P{α1 ≤ t} = P
{
ei
ui
≤ t for some ui > 0
}
,
and hence
max
ui>0
P{ln ei ≤ lnuit} ≤ P{α1 ≤ t} ≤ |{i : ui > 0}|max
ui>0
P{ln ei ≤ lnuit},
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which again by using Laplace principle, results in
σ2 lnP{α1 ≤ t} → max
ui>0
{
− inf
x≤ln(uit)
(x− µi)2
2
}
= −min
ui>0
{
inf
x≤ln(uit)
(x− µi)2
2
}
= − inf
x≤t
(ln(ukx)− µi)2
2
Therefore, the family {ασ1}σ>0 satisfies a large deviation principle with rate function r(t) defined
by
r(t) =

∑
i:ln(uit)>µi
(ln(uit)− µi)2/2, t ≥ α1
(ln(ukt)− µk)2/2, t < α1
Example 3.1.2. Large Deviation Principle of αmax. We derive a similar large deviation principle
for the largest default threshold αmax. From appendix B we know that αmax is equal to the smallest
number δ such that Ae ≤ δv, where A is a square matrix and v is a vector, both derived from P .
Thus it is easy to see that
αmax = max
{
(Ae)i
vi
: vi > 0
}
.
Now let’s consider the probability P{αmax ≤ t}. Before doing that, define
Dt def= {y ∈ Rn : (Aey)i ≤ vit, vi > 0}.
Here ey is a vector, the i-th component of which is eyi.
Therefore,
P{αmax ≤ t} = P{ln e ∈ Dt}
=
∫
Dt
(
1√
2piσ
)n
exp
{
−
∑
i(yi − µi)2
2σ2
}
dy.
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Again, by Laplace principle, we have that
σ2 lnP{αmax ≤ t} → rmax def= − inf
y∈Dt
∑
i
(yi − µi)2
2
, as σ goes to 0.
In particular, if µ = (µ1, µ2, · · · , µn) is not in Dt, the rate rmax would be strictly negative, in
which case the probability P{αmax ≤ t} decays exponentially.
Though we have established an expression of the rate, it is still not enough to compute its
numerical value explicitly. The main difficulty lies in the determination of the infimum of the
function
∑
i(yi − µi)2 with the constraint y ∈ Dt. The set Dt is given by several inequalities, each
of which is in form of (Aey)i ≤ vit and indicates a convex set in Rn. Thus, as the intersection of
convex sets, Dt itself is also a convex set. The infimum d(µ, y) for y ∈ Dt is attained at a unique
point, say y∗, on the the boundary of Dt. We might have to employ tools from programming theory
to locate y∗ precisely, but it is still possible to give some bounds of the infimum.
For each i such that vi > 0, we denote by Dit the set {y ∈ Rn : (Aey)i ≤ vit}. Thus a trivial
lower bound for d(µ,Dt) is max{d(µ,Dit) : vi > 0)}.
Example 3.1.3. Let’s look back on the example cited in the section 2.4. Recall that the position
matrix is given by
P =

N1 N2 N3 N4
N1 0 2 0 1
N2 0 0 3 0
N3 1 0 0 5
N4 0 1 0 0

,
and the endowment vector is
Ee =

3
4
2
5

.
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Thus the vector u is
u = (P − P T )1 =

2
0
3
−5

,
and the vector µ is
µ = ln e =

ln 3
ln 4
ln 2
ln 5

.
With µ and u, we can directly compute rate r1 for any given t as follows:
r1 = − inf
x≥ln (2t)
(x− ln 3)2
2
− inf
x≥ln (3t)
(x− ln 2)2
2
=

0 if t ≤ 23
−12(ln 2t3 )2 if 23 ≤ t ≤ 32
−12(ln 2t3 )2 − 12(ln 3t2 )2 if t ≥ 32 .
As for the largest threshold, we need to compute the matrix A and the vector v. Inputting the
initials, we obtain that
A =

1.125 0.75 0.75 0
0.1875 1.125 1.125 0
0.1875 0.125 1.125 0
0 0 0 0

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and
v =

3
1
6
0

Thus the Dt for this example is given as below:
1.125ey1 + 0.75ey2 + 0.75ey3 ≤ 3t
0.1875ey1 + 1.125ey2 + 1.125ey3 ≤ t
0.1875ey1 + 0.125ey2 + 1.125ey3 ≤ 6t
We can then use Lagrange multiplier to find the distance between µ and the region defined by each
inequality. However, this task has to be solved via numerical methods, since the procedure involves
solving a transcendental equation. For P{αmax > t}, we can do the same thing theoretically.
More generally, noticing that each term in default threshold sequence depends on the endowment
vector, we can derive large deviations principle for them with the lemma:
Lemma 3.1.1. (Contraction Principle)Assume that {X} valued in X satisfies a large deviation
principle with rate function r(·) as  goes to 0 and that f is a continuous map from X to Y. Then
the family {Y = f(X)} satisfies a large deviation principle with rate function rf (·) defined as
rf (y)
def
= inf{x:f(x)=y} r(x).
See the proof of this lemma in Dembo & Zeitouni (1998). With this lemma, we can derive
large deviation principles for every default threshold with assumption that the endowment satisfies
some large deviation principle. For instance, let’s use this method to take a closer look at the large
deviation principle of α1 in the last example.
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Example 3.1.4. We have that
u =

2
0
3
−5

and µ =

ln 3
ln 4
ln 2
ln 5

,
from which we derive that α1 = 2/3. Noting that u1 > 0 and u3 > 0, we see that α
σ
1 depends
on only eσ1 and e
σ
3 . Hence we only need to consider the large deviation principle of (e
σ
1 , e
σ
3 ). By
the assumption that ln ei is N (µi, σ) and they are independent of each other, the rate function of
(eσ1 , e
σ
3 ) is
r(x1, x3) =
1
2
{
(lnx1 − ln 3)2 + (lnx3 − ln 2)2
}
, (x1, x3) ∈ R+ × R+.
Since ασ1 = min{eσ1/2, eσ3/3}, the continuous map f is
f(x1, x3) = min {x1/2, x3/3} .
By lemma 3.1.1, the rate function for ασ1 is
rf (y) = inf
x:f(x)=y
r(x)
= inf
{
inf
y=x1/2,3x1≤2x3
r(x), inf
y=x3/3,3x1≥2x3
r(x)
}
= min
{
inf
x∈E1(y)
r(x), inf
x∈E3(y)
r(x)
}
,
where E1(y) = {x : y = x1/2, 3x1 ≤ 2x3} and E3 = {x : y = x3/3, 3x1 ≥ 2x3}
If y ≤ 2/3, we see that
rf (y) = min
{
1
2
(ln(2y)− ln 3)2, 1
2
(ln(3y)− ln 2)2
}
=
1
2
(ln(3y)− ln 2)2.
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If 2/3 < y < 3/2, then
inf
E1(y)
r(x) =
1
2
(ln(2y)− ln 3)2 + inf
x1=2y,3x1≤2x3
1
2
((ln(x3)− ln 2)2
=
1
2
((ln(2y)− ln 3)2 + 1
2
(ln(3y)− 2)2,
and
inf
E3(y)
r(x) = inf
x3=3y,3x1≥2x3
1
2
(ln(x1)− ln 3)2 + 1
2
(ln(3y)− 2)2
=
1
2
(ln(3y)− 2)2,
and hence rf (y) =
1
2(ln(3y)− 2)2.
If y ≥ 3/2, we have that
inf
E1(y)
r(x) =
1
2
(ln(2y)− ln 3)2 + inf
x1=2y,3x1≤2x3
1
2
((ln(x3)− ln 2)2
=
1
2
((ln(2y)− ln 3)2 + 1
2
(ln(3y)− 2)2,
and
inf
E3(y)
r(x) = inf
x3=3y,3x1≥2x3
1
2
(ln(x1)− ln 3)2 + 1
2
(ln(3y)− 2)2
=
1
2
((ln(2y)− ln 3)2 + 1
2
(ln(3y)− 2)2,
and hence rf (y) =
1
2((ln(2y) − ln 3)2 + 12(ln(3y) − 2)2. Compare rf ’s expression to that which is
given in example 3.1.1 and they do coincide.
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3.2 Perturbation to position matrix
Now we consider the effect on default threshold sequence by perturbation to position matrix. Note
that in the expression of α1, the vector u is perturbed. Therefore the set {i : ui > 0} is also
perturbed. However, if the perturbation is small enough, the perturbed α1 is still close enough to
the original one: assume that P σij ≥ 0 converges to Pij > 0 as σ goes to 0. As we can see in the
definition of α1, it exists if and only if
∑
j(Pij −Pji) = 0 for all i. Suppose that this occurs for our
Pij ’s and hence α1 =∞. Thus the fact that
∑
i(P
σ
ij − P σji) goes to 0 for all i, implies that ασ1 also
goes to ∞. If α1 exists as a real number, then the fact that the map P → α1 is continuous where
the row sum of P − P T does not vanish implies that ασ1 tends to α1. Here we can claim that ασ1
always converges to α1.
Again, by the contraction principle, if P satisfies some large deviation principle, then α1 also
satisfies a large deviation principle. Theoretically its rate function can be obtained by solving an
optimization problem.
For the largest default threshold αmax, the analysis is much more complicated, since a pertur-
bation can change the topology of the network too much, even if the perturbation is small enough.
Indeed, a perturbation to a zero entry of P might decrease the number of the communicating
class, which further impacts the ultimate defaults set, and hence the αmax is also influenced in an
unexpected way. The following example shows this worry does exist.
Example 3.2.1. Suppose the network is set with
P =

0 2 0 0
3 0 0 0
0 0 0 3
0 0 4 0

and e =

1
1
1
1

.
It is easy to check that αmax = 1, and the ultimate default set D = {2, 4}. If P13 is reset as , then
both node 1 and node 2 are not recurrent state any more, which means that they would ultimately
default. Thus the updated ultimate default set D is instead {1, 2, 4}. Now let’s determine the
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updated αmax. Denote the change of price by δ > 0. According to Eisenberg-Noe Scheme, the
clearing payment vector (p∗1, p∗2, p∗3, p∗4)T should satisfy
p∗1 = p∗2 + 1 ≤ (2 + )δ
p∗2 =
2
2+p
∗
1 + 1 ≤ 3δ
p∗3 = 3δ ≤ 2+p∗1 + p∗4 + 1
p∗4 = p∗3 + 1 ≤ 4δ
, from which we derive αmax = max{4+3 , 5+(2+) , 1}, which goes to ∞ as  goes to 0.
Motivated by the example above, the perturbation to position matrix must be properly restricted
in order that αmax does not deviate too much and therefore a large deviation principle can be drawn.
One way to eliminate the worry is to allow perturbation to those positive entries in P , which does
not change the connectedness of the network. However the following example shows that this rule
is not enough.
Example 3.2.2. Suppose the network is set with
P =

0 1 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
 and e =

2
1
1
 .
It is easy to see that α1 = αmax = 1, and only node 1 defaults. However, if we change P23 from
1 to 1 + , the balance between symmetry between node 2 and node 3 is broken and node 2 would
ultimately default, and αmax = 2/.
The problem here is that the default threshold sequence sometimes can only record the infor-
mation of the default pattern of the network but not the information of each single node. So we
instead consider the perturbation to the individual default thresholds. We claim that α(i)σ is close
enough to α(i) if the perturbation is small enough.
Theorem 3.2.1. If P σij tends to Pij for all (i, j), then α(i)
σ tends to α(i) for all i.
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Before proving the theorem, let’s improve the algorithm which is used to find all the default
threshold sequence a little bit. Recall in that algorithm, there might be multiple defaults occurring
at some default threshold level, that is, there are several nodes sharing the same default threshold.
In that case, we add all of those node into the default set D before entering the next iteration of
the algorithm.
However, there is an equivalent way running the algorithm, which might slow down a little bit
but still produces the same default threshold sequence. For the new method, we can random;y
order the nodes, push only the one with the smallest symbol to the default set D at a time and
keep the rest in the non-default set N . This operation is safe because at a default threshold level
we can regard the node both defaulting and non-defaulting, since it does clear all its liability but
meanwhile retains zero terminal value. Therefore, this new algorithm does not change the values
of default threshold sequence but might output identical default thresholds in consecutive steps till
all the nodes are pushed in D. From now on, we start using the updated algorithm and for clarity,
we denote by D˜ the default set accordingly.
Proof of theorem 3.2.1. If the initial position matrix P is such that
∑
j(Pij − P Tji ) = 0 for all j,
then the original individual default threshold sequence is α(i) ≡ ∞. In this case, α1 = ∞ and
hence α(i) =∞ for all i. We have already shown at the beginning of this section that ασ1 tends to
∞, and it follows immediately that ασ(i) also tends to ∞ for all i. So the claim holds.
Otherwise, α1 is real, and we have also shown that α
σ
1 tends to it. Note that if P
σ is close
enough to P , there must be a node that lies in both D and Dσ, so we can pick this node and
push it to both D˜ and D˜σ. Since they are the same, denote them by D¯. Then we consider the
matrix M1 and M
σ which are the restriction of ΠT and (Πσ)T on D¯ × D¯. Recall that we need
to calculate the inverse of I − M1 and I − Mσ1 . In most cases, these two matrix differs by an
amount of O(σ)) if ||P σ − P || = O(σ) except for the only possibility that for some node i ∈ D
Pij = 0 for all j and P
σ
ik = O(σ) > 0 for some node k. However, this exception can never happen;
otherwise, the assumption Pij = 0 for all j implies that i does not have any nominal liability
to others and hence it cannot default, which is contradictory to another assumption that i ∈ D.
Therefore ||(I−M1)−(I−Mσ1 )|| = ||M1−Mσ1 || = O(σ), since M1(j, i) = Πij = Pij/
∑
j Pij with the
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denominator strictly larger than 0. Then (I−Mσ1 )−1 = (I+(I−M1)−1(M1−Mσ1 ))−1(I−M1)−1 =
(I +O(σ)) shows that (I −Mσ1 )−1 tends to (I −M1)−1 on each entry. So far we can conclude that
the coefficients in equations (2.4) are continuous in σ, which implies that α2 depends continuously
upon P .
If α2 is∞, we can terminate the procedure by the argument applied when α1 =∞ and conclude
the claim; else, we update D˜ and D˜σ and redo what we have done after α1 is found out.
Remark 3.2.2. We should note that for two perturbations the corresponding orders of nodes that
fall into default pool might not be the same. However, this does not affect the continuity of individual
default thresholds.
So we have proved the continuity of α(·) upon P , and a large deviation principle of α(·) can be
derived if a large deviation principle of P is provided. Let’s see an example.
Example 3.2.3. Suppose that a position matrix is in form of ((Nij)
+), where {Nij}i<j is a family of
independent gaussian random variables and Nij +Nji = 0. Further assume that Nij ∼ N (µij , σ2ij)
with fixed {µij}’s and {σij}’s and  shrinking to 0. The position matrices {Pij} satisfy a large
deviation principle due to a direct application of contraction principle with the continuous map
f : Rn(n−1)/2 → Rn2, given by f(x)ij = (xij)+ if i < j and f(x)ij = (xij)− if i > j, acting on the
family {Nij}, which satisfy a large deviation principle by Laplace principle.
Theoretically, we already know that the large deviation principle of {α1} can be drawn from the
large deviation principle of {P}, but it is not very easy to write down the rate function, since it
involves an optimization problem with n(n− 1)/2 variables. We can use a trick here to reduce the
dimension of the optimization problem by applying contract principle to another family of random
variables valued in a lower-dimension space. Thus we directly consider the family {Z()i =
∑
j(Pij−
Pji)/ei}i∈V , where Pij = (Nij)+. Hence Pij − Pji = Nij. Consider the log-moment generating
function
Λ(λ) = logEe<λ,Z
()>, λ ∈ Rn.
By the Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem, if Λ(λ) = lim→0 Λ(λ/) exists as an extended real number with
the origin in the domain and is essentially smooth and lower continuous, then the family {Z()}
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satisfy a large deviation principle with the good rate function Λ∗(·), which is the Fenchel-Legendre
transform of Λ(·). Now lets check the condition.
With the independence of {Nij}i<j and the the moment generating function of N (µ, σ) is
exp{µt+ σ2t2/2}, we can easily derive that
Λ(λ) =
∑
i<j
µij
(
λi
ei
− λj
ej
)
+
1
2
σ2
(
λi
ei
− λj
ej
)2
,
From this
Λ(λ) = lim
→0
Λ(λ/) =
∑
i<j
µij
(
λi
ei
− λj
ej
)
+
1
2
σ2
(
λi
ei
− λj
ej
)2
,
which is a smooth function in Rn, and hence we can claim the {Z} satisfy a large deviation
principle with rate function Λ∗(·).
Recall that Λ∗(x) def= supλ{< x, λ > −Λ(λ)}. Before optimizing gx(λ) def=< x, λ > −Λ(λ), we
substitute λ by λ = (eiηi), and hence it is equivalent to optimize
g˜x(η) =
∑
i
xieiηi −
∑
i<j
(
µij (ηi − ηj) + 1
2
σ2 (ηi − ηj)2
)
.
Motivated by the fact that
∑
i Z
()
i ei = 0, we first consider x ∈ Rn such that
∑
i xiei = 0. In
this case, if we let η go to infinity along any direction not parallel to 1, then the quadratic part
exists and goes to negative infinity, which says that g˜x(η) also goes to negative infinity; otherwise,
if η = r1 for r ∈ R, then gx(η) vanishes. Hence the supreme of g˜ is attained somewhere. To locate
it, set its gradient to 0. Then we see that

(n− 1) −1 −1 · · · −1
−1 (n− 1) −1 · · · −1
−1 −1 (n− 1) · · · ...
...
...
...
. . . −1
−1 −1 · · · −1 (n− 1)


η1
η2
...
ηn−1
ηn

= σ−2

x1e1 +
∑
i µi1
x2e2 +
∑
i µi2
...
xn−1en−1 +
∑
i µi,(n−1)
xnen +
∑
i µin

.
This system admits a solution since
∑
i xiei = 0. In detail, the general solution to the system is
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η∗ + t1, where η∗ is a special solution and t varies in R, since the kernel of the coefficient matrix
is 1-dimensional and 1 lies in it. Besides, any solution η makes that η∗i − η∗j = (xiei − xjej +∑
k(µki − µkj))/(nσ2), independent of the choice of η, and that
∑
i xieiηi =< x˜, η >=< x˜, η
∗ >
+t < x˜,1 >=< x˜, η∗ >, which is also independent of the choice of η. Thus any solution to ∇g˜x = 0
maximizes g˜x. So we can set ηn to 0, and hence ηi = xiei − xnen +
∑
k(µki − µkn). Putting this η
into g˜, we can get that
Λ∗(x) =
1
2nσ2
||x˜− µ˜||2L2 ,
where x˜ = (xiei) and µ˜ = (
∑
k µik). For x such that
∑
i xiei 6= 0, it is easy to see that the supremum
is always +∞. Hence the rate function is
Λ∗(x) =

1
2nσ2
∑
i(xiei − µi)2, if < x, e >= 0
+∞, otherwise
,
where µi =
∑
j µij.
Consider the ”expected” position matrix P¯ = ((µij)
+), and its α¯1 is (maxi{µi/ei})−1, which
is assumed to be equal to µk/ek. Thus, the probability of events such as {|α1 − α¯1| > δ} would
always decay to 0 exponentially, since Λ∗ = 0 only if x = (µi/ei). As for the rate of the exponential
decay, we need to compute the rate function of α1 at a given value, say t > 0, which is reduced to n
problems of minimization of a quadratic function, which is a convex function, subject to restrictions
in the form
xk = t
−1, xi ≤ t−1 for i 6= k,
∑
i 6=k
xi = −t−1,
for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Hence it is applicable to use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition to locate
the minimum.
The method given in example 3.2.3 works for a large family of random matrices which is con-
sistent with the definition of a position matrix. We can always compute the logarithm moment
generating function of (X1/e1, X2/e2, . . . , Xn/en) and then apply the Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem to
claim its large deviation principle, after which we use optimization method to find out the rate
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function of α1.
As for other default threshold levels, the rate function is much harder to compute. The main
difficulty lies in how to determine the default set. For some family of random matrices, for example,
for which the probability is supported in a compact set which is so small the default set can be
constant. In this case, it is easier to give an expression of the inequality which determines the default
threshold. For some other family, the default set might be almost constant, with an exception with
exponentially small probability, a large deviation principle is still expected, if the shrinkage of the
exception is fast enough. However, we do not give any concrete example here since the following
work always consists of only complicated calculation, which is not our focus here.
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Chapter 4
Novation of a Financial Network
4.1 Novation of a Trade
In this chapter we consider the an operation on a financial network, which is called novation, and
take a close look at how such operation affects the risk of this network. Before introducing the
concept of novation, let’s first introduce the concept of central clearing counterparty(CCP).
The life cycle of a derivatives trade consists of three separate stages: execution, clearing and
settlement. Execution of a trade involves a buyer and a seller entering into a specific legal obligation
to buy or sell the underlying asset, index, or interest rate of the particular derivatives contract.
There are two sides, or legs, to every trade: the buy (or long) position and the sell (or short)
position. Clearing refers to what happens between the execution of a trade and its settlement. Very
frequently, clearing and settlement are viewed as being the same process, but they are fundamentally
different. Basic clearing services offered by any clearing house would include trade matching and
confirmation, transaction/position management, and delivery management. As noted by Knott
and Mills (2002), not all clearing houses act as CCPs. Clearing can occur without the clearing
house acting as a CCP, in which case, the clearing house simply plays an agency role and does not
novate contracts. In the case in which the clearing house also acts as a CCP (which is typically
the case today), additional clearing services are provided, including the novation and netting of
trade exposures. So, while novation implies clearing, the opposite is not true. Turning to the last
stage in the life cycle of a derivatives trade, settlement involves the fulfilment of the legal obligation
specified in the contract, whereby the duration of the contract expires or the position is closed out
(see Hasenpusch (2009) for a detailed discussion of a trade’s life cycle).
Figure 4.1 (taken from Hasenpusch (2009), p. 24) illustrates a trade between counterparties A
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and B with and without novation provided by a CCP or clearing house. The upper panel shows
the trade between A and B, where A is selling, while B is buying, the underlying asset, index,
or interest rate without novation. Since the bilateral trade is not novated by a CCP, both A and
B are exposed to counterparty risk from each other. In this bilateral market, A and B need to
deal directly with each other and make their own arrangements for all post-trade services. Such
a pre-settlement arrangement is known as a direct (or bilateral) clearing arrangement (see Moser
(1998) for details). The lower panel shows what happens when novation by a CCP is introduced.
Novation is performed as a clearing service by the CCP by stepping into the bilateral contract,
becoming the buyer to A and the seller to B. Hence, A and B’s counterparty risk to each other
is replaced by counterparty risk to the CCP. In addition to novating the contract, the CCP also
guarantees contract performance of both legs of the original contract.
Figure 4.1: Legal relationship between counterparties to a trade prior to and after novation
Besides novation, the bilateral and multilateral netting of trading exposures are important
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concepts. Figure 4.2 (also taken from Hasenpusch (2009), p. 25) illustrates a bilateral market with
and without bilateral netting, and a clearing network with and without multilateral netting. The
two left panels show a bilateral market without (upper panel) and with bilateral netting (lower
panel). Note that bilateral netting permits amounts owed between any two counterparties to be
summed into a single net amount owed from one counterparty to the other, thereby aggregating
the flows between each pair of counterparties into one net amount. The upper right panel shows
the multilateral case in which there is a clearing house that does not serve as a CCP, while the
lower right panel shows the case with a clearing house that is also a CCP. Note that multilateral
netting involves the CCP netting all offsetting positions of its counterparties to a single net amount
between it and and each of its counterparties. As such, the multilateral net position captures the
bilateral net position between each clearing member and the CCP (see Hasenpusch (2009) for a
detailed discussion of bilateral vs multilateral netting).
Figure 4.2: Left: A stylized bilateral market. Right: A centrally cleared market
With regard to the advantages and disadvantages of different pre-settlement arrangements for
OTC derivatives, most of the recent policy debate has focused on how the transition from bilateral
markets to CCP clearing networks could reduce systemic risk. The reduction in systemic risk
would stem from the novation provided by a CCP (i.e., by relieving their clients of counterparty
risk), a CCP’s use of margins and default funds to manage and mitigate its counterparty risk,
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trading exposures that are concentrated, multilaterally netted, and dealt with by dedicated market
infrastructures, and a CCP’s ability to ensure rigorous and more transparent risk management.1 For
example, Jackson & Manning (2007) study different pre-settlement agreements (bilateral vs. central
clearing) in order to compare results for different clearing arrangements along three dimensions: the
cost of posting collateral as required by the different infrastructures; the size of replacement costs
should default occur; and the concentration of costs among system participants. Their numerical
simulations indicate that a CCP clearing network decreases overall costs compared to a direct or
bilateral arrangement.
In other work, Ceccheti, Gyntelberg & Hollanders (2009) discuss the benefits of lower counter-
party risk and increased transparency of CCP clearing networks compared to direct or bilateral
clearing arrangements. Bliss & Steigerwald (2006) describe the interrelated services provided by a
CCP, including credit risk management, delegated monitoring, and liquidity enhancement. More
recently, Cont & Moussa (2010) show that central clearing can break the chain of contagion associ-
ated with a cascade of counterparty defaults, leading to less systemic risk.2 However, CCP clearing
networks are not without their risks. Important risks associated with central clearing include the
concentration of counterparty risk and operational risk in the CCP, and the moral hazard and
adverse selection problems that stem from the mutualization of loss or loss sharing among clearing
network members.
In contrast to the studies that show efficiency gains from central clearing, Duffie & Zhu (2011)
show that central clearing can be less netting-efficient than bilateral trading, if there are different
asset classes of contracts, and the CCP clears only one of the contracts. The decrease in netting
efficiency arises because netting across asset classes due to hedging is not taken into account and,
consequently, collateral requirements increase. However, Cont & Kokholm (2012) show that Duffie’s
and Zhu’s results stem from their assumption of independent and identically distributed (i.e., IID)
Gaussian exposures across asset classes. When the IID Gaussian assumption is relaxed, Cont &
1 Haene & Sturm (2009) examine the factors that affect the trade-off between margins and the default fund in a
model of CCP risk management, and find that the optimal balance between the two risk-management instruments
depends on collateral costs, participants’ default probability, and the extent to which margin requirements are asso-
ciated with risk-mitigating incentives. Cohen-Cole, Kirilenko & Patacchini (2011) examine the role played by market
structure in CCP clearing networks in determining liquidity provision and in understanding shock amplification.
2Pirrong (2011) provides a comprehensive overview of the benefits and risks of central clearing.
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Kokholm (2012) find results that are opposite of those presented by Duffie and Zhu in terms of
netting efficiency when a CCP is introduced to clear contracts for one asset class.
4.2 Central Clearing Network Model Description
We use the abstract model of Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012), where there is a single contract traded
in a network with M participants. The details of the contract are not specified here, since our sole
interest is the topology of the CCP clearing network and its implications for the largest exposure
faced by a CCP.3
We first review the hierarchical clearing model of Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012), and begin with
a description of the network structure. There are M network participants or nodes, denoted by
m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .M − 1}, that are arranged in a directed network or tree. We assume that there are
three types of nodes:
a) one central counterparty (CCP), which is denoted by 0.
b) G general clearing members (GCMs), which can directly clear through the CCP. We assume
that G ≥ 2, and the GCMs are assigned indices from the set G = {1, 2, . . . G}.
c) one or more clients or non-clearing members. We assign each client an index number from
the set C def= {G + 1, G + 2 . . .M − 1} and assume that participant m (where m ∈ C) clears
through C(m) ∈ G (note that there are M − 1 − G clients in the network and that clients
cannot trade directly with the CCP).
For each GCM m ∈ {1, 2 . . . G} in the network, we define the set:
G(m) = {m} ∪ {m′ ∈ C : C(m′) = m},
which consists of GCM m and its clients, i.e., G(m) is the set of clients that GCM m clears (and
3We do not consider issues related to margins, collateral, or netting. See Singh (2010) for a discussion of these
issues for a CCP network structure.
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the set also includes the GCM). Furthermore, we define
Km
def
= |G(m)|,
where Km is the number of participants in GCM m’s group. Note that
G∑
m=1
Km + 1 = M. (4.1)
We model the trading exposures between the M network participants, or nodes, with a M ×M
trading matrix, T, where T denotes the trading network. For any two participants, m and m′ in
the network, Tm,m′ denotes the notional trading exposure of m against m
′. For example, T1,2 = x
means that counterparty 1 is owed x contracts by counterparty 2. Of course, then, counterparty 2
owes x contracts to counterparty 1; i.e., T21 = −T12 (with |T12| = |T21| = |x|, which is the size of
the trading exposure). Because we assume that all trades are first bilaterally netted, the matrix T
is negative- or skew-symmetric about the main diagonal, since its transpose is also its negative. To
save space, we let SM be the collection of M ×M skew-symmetric matrices.
While trading creates buy-side and sell-side exposures among network participants, the clearing
process redistributes them via novation, and the way in which exposures are cleared depends on
the topology of the network.4 The issue that we address in this paper is how novation aggregates
counterparty risk after trading exposures are cleared by the GCMs and ultimately by the CCP.
Specifically, we want to randomly select the trading exposures (the Tm,m′s), and examine the effect
of central clearing on the largest exposure of the CCP to an individual GCM. In doing so, we focus
on how varying levels of tiering (direct vs. indirect participation of network participants with the
CCP) and concentration (the distribution of non-clearing members or clients across the GCMs in
the network) can generate large maximum exposures for the CCP.
We follow Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012) and assume a simple statistical structure for the trading
exposures.
Assumption 4.2.1. We assume {Tm,m′ ; 0 ≤ m1 < m2 ≤M−1} is an independent and identically
4For a detailed discussion of trading, clearing, and settlement in clearing networks, see Hasenpusch (2009).
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distributed collection of Gaussian random variables, each one with mean 0 and variance 1.5
This is, admittedly, the simplest stochastic structure that could be used in modeling the trading
exposures. In reality, trading exposures will neither be identically distributed(some traders take
on larger positions than others) nor independent (there are common economic and financial risk
factors that drive trading). Nevertheless, we believe that Assumption 2.1 provides a useful and
tractable way to capture the interaction between the network topology and the stochastic process
driving trading exposures in our analysis.6
We allow the ’trading’ network and the ’clearing’ network to interact through a novation op-
erator, which captures the total exposures of the CCP to the GCMs for a given trading matrix
T ∈ SM . For a set of trading exposures, the novation operator produces a G-valued vector, where
each element in the vector denotes the exposure of the CCP to each respective GCM. Specifically,
for T ∈ SM , we define a 1×G row vector ΓC(T ) ∈ RG as:
ΓCm(T )
def
=
∑
m1,m2∈{0,1,...M−1}
m1 6∈G(m)
m2∈G(m)
Tm1,m2 (4.2)
for each m ∈ G. This vector provides the exposures of the CCP to the different GCMs in the
network; i.e., ΓC1 (T ) is the exposure of the CCP to the first GCM, Γ
C
2 (T ) is the exposure of the
CCP to the second GCM, and so forth.7 Recalling that the clearing of trading exposures can only
occur between market participants and their respective clearers (i.e., clients clear through their
GCMs and the GCMs clear through the CCP), and to better understand the formula in (4.2), we
note that ΓCm(T ), which is the exposure after clearing of the m-th GCM, consists of the sum of the
trading exposures of all clients not in GCM m’s trading group to all clients in GCM m’s trading
5Note that Tm,m = 0 and Tm′,m = −Tm,m′ (i.e., T is skew-symmetric), so we in effect have
(
M
2
)
independent
standard Gaussian random variables.
6Moreover, it serves as a useful benchmark that can be used to examine the effects of relaxing the assumption and
allowing for non-Gaussian, heterogeneous, and correlated trading exposures as done by Cont & Kokholm (2012) in a
different modeling context.In future work, we plan to relax Assumption 4.2.1 to allow for non-Gaussian, heterogeneous
and correlated trading exposures. We also intend to use dynamically evolving exposures; i.e., a random time series
of matrices in SM which would represent the evolution of the trading exposures from one day to the next. We will
return to this issue in a another paper.
7The model of clearing here uses the accounting approach of account pooling. According to this approach, a
clearer pools, or sums, exposures from its own proprietary trading accounts with its clients’ trading exposures.
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group. A GCM acts as the CCP for its two clients and novates their trades, although it cannot
guarantee contract performance. However, any trade between one of the GCM’s clients and some
market participant outside its client pool would be novated by each of the clients’ respective GCMs
and then ultimately novated by the CCP. In deriving the maximum-exposure probability, only the
trades that clear through the CCP are relevant; all the other trades are irrelevant.
Following Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012), we distinguish between a GCM’s internalized and non-
internalized trades. A GCM’s internalized trades refer to those trades that are either never novated
(i.e., those trades between the GCM and its clients) or are novated (i.e., those trades between the
GCM’s clients) and, consequently, are not in turn novated by the CCP. In contrast, a GCM’s non-
internalized trades refer to those trades between one of its clients and counterparties of the client
that are not in the GCM’s clearing pool. Therefore, internalized trades are irrelevant in measuring
the CCP’s maximum-exposure risk, since they never reach the CCP.
4.3 Example
In order to illustrate the basic features of the central clearing network described above, and to make
the notation more understandable, we present an example. Figure 4.3 shows the tree structure of
this simple CCP clearing network. We assume that there is one CCP(which we label CCP0), two
GCMs(which we label as G1 and G2), and three clients (which we label as C3, C4 and C5). We
assume that clients C3 and C4 clear their trades through G1 and client C5 clears through G2.
Then, using the notation presented above, C(3) = C(4) = 1 and C(5) = 2, G(1) = {1, 3, 4} and
CCP0
G2
C5
G1
C4C3
Figure 4.3: CCP Clearing Network
G(2) = {2, 5}. Similar to the CCP, the GCMs can novate trades, but unlike the CCP, they cannot
guarantee contract performance.
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Assume that we have randomly selected a specific trading exposure matrix T ∈ S6 given by
T =

CCP0 G1 G2 C3 C4 C5
CCP0 0 4 −5 3 6 −2
G1 −4 0 2 −1 4 −3
G2 5 −2 0 7 −3 1
C3 −3 1 −7 0 −1 5
C4 −6 −4 3 1 0 2
C5 2 3 −1 −5 −2 0

. (4.3)
Although the CCP is included in the trading exposure matrix, CCPs do not actively trade. In-
stead, CCPs typically have a flat book, or zero net exposure, and only novate the non-internalized
exposures of their GCMs; and, clients cannot trade directly with the CCP. This, however, has no
impact on our results.
By way of illustration, and as shown in the trading exposure matrix above, client C3 is owed
5 contracts by client C5 and owes 7 contracts to GCM G2. Since each client trades with other
participants or nodes only through its GCM, we can then compute the overall exposure of each
GCM to each of its clients.8 For example, the exposure of G1 to C3 is given by
3− 1 + 7 + 0 + 1− 5 = 5,
i.e., we sum the exposures of all trading counterparties to C3 (which have the opposite sign from C3’s
trading exposures), all of which are cleared through G1. A similar calculation gives the exposure
of G1 to C4 and G2 to C5 (note that after clearing, G1 has no direct exposure to C5, which is not
in its client pool, and similarly neither does G2 have any exposure to C3 or C4). Using (4.2), we
can also compute the exposure of the CCP to each of the GCMs, G1 and G2. For example, the
8We do not consider the effect of collateral on the credit risk of exposures. See Siddique (2012) for a discussion of
the many different exposure measures used in modeling counterparty risk.
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exposure ΓC1 (T ) of the CCP to G1 is given by
ΓC1 (T ) = 4− 2 + 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1
+ 3 + 7− 5︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3
+ 6− 3− 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4
= 11, (4.4)
which is the sum of the exposures of CCP0, G2, and C5 to G1, C3, and C4. Noting that the cross-
exposures between G2, C3, and C4 can be summed to zero (each positive term has an off-setting
negative term), we can replace (4.4) by the sums of the columns of (4.3) corresponding to G1, C3,
and C4. Given this, we can rewrite (4.4) as
9
ΓC1 (T ) = 4 + 0− 2 + 1− 4 + 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1
+ 3− 1 + 7 + 0 + 1− 5︸ ︷︷ ︸
C3
+ 6 + 4− 3− 1 + 0− 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C4
= 11.
The resulting matrix of exposures after clearing is:
TC =

CCP0 G1 G2 C3 C4 C5
CCP0 0 11 −5 0 0 0
G1 −11 0 0 5 4 0
G2 5 0 0 0 0 3
C3 0 −5 0 0 0 0
C4 0 −4 0 0 0 0
C5 0 0 0 −3 0 0

.
The row vector ΓC is part of the first row (corresponding to entries 2 through G + 1). In our
example, we have that
ΓC(T ) = (11,−5).
As noted above, we measure the exposure risk of a CCP, for a given network topology, in terms
of the probability associated with the largest exposure of the CCP against an individual GCM. As
9Thus, we can replace (4.2) with
ΓCm(T ) =
∑
m1,m2∈{0,1,...M−1}
m2∈G(m)
Tm1,m2 .
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such, then, our measure of risk is based on the maximum value of ΓC(T ), i.e.,10
R(T ) def= max
k∈G
ΓCk (T ).
In the above example, the maximum exposure of the CCP is to the first GCM, where R(T ) = 11.
As noted above, our focus here is the probability that R(T ) is large. For a given assumed
statistical description of the trading exposure matrix T in (4.3), we analytically derive an expression
for P{R(T ) ≥ L}, when L is large, and provide insight into the most likely network topologies that
contribute to this possibility. To do this, we use the theory of Laplace asymptotics, which captures
the dominant exponential behavior of an integral of decaying exponential terms. This theory (and
the related theory of large deviations) is a standard tool for modeling and understanding rare events
in stochastic networks (see Dembo & Zeitouni (1998), Pham (2007), and Pham (2010)).
In Section 4 below, we show that
P{R(T ) ≥ L}  exp [−βL2] ,
as L↗∞; in other words,
lim
L→∞
1
L2
lnP{R(T ) ≥ L} = −β.
Because β, which is the rate function or exponential decay rate in the probability expression above,
depends on the network topology and various statistics of the trading exposure matrix in (4.3),
we can identify the functional dependence using the theory of Laplace asymptotics (presented in
Appendix B.
4.4 Central Clearing Network Topology and Network Stability
In this section, we examine how the maximum-exposure probability presented above varies with
the degrees of tiering and concentration of a CCP clearing network. As noted in Section 2, we
assume that the trading exposures between any two counterparties before being cleared are dis-
10A CCP’s maximum exposure against network GCMs is referred to as the CME in Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012).
51
tributed independently and identically and follow a standard Gaussian distribution. As a result of
our assumptions, we can compute the covariance matrix Σ of ΓC(T ), using some straightforward
calculations. For a fixed m ∈ {1, 2 . . . G}, there are
|G(m)| (M − |G(m)|) = Km(M −Km)
terms in the expression of (4.2) for ΓCm(T ). With the elements of the trading matrix T assumed
to have mean zero and unit variance, we have that the variance of ΓCm(T ) is Km(M − Km). For
fixed m and m′ in {1, 2 . . . G}, we can compute Σm,m′ (the (m,m′) entry of the covariance matrix
Σ) with some straightforward calculations. We have that
Σm,m′ = E
[
ΓCm(T )Γ
C
m′(T )
]
= E


∑
m1,m2∈{0,1,...M−1}
m1∈G(m′)
m2∈G(m)
Tm1,m2 +
∑
m1,m2∈{0,1,2...M−1}
m1 6∈G(m′)∪G(m)
m2∈G(m)
Tm1,m2

×

∑
m1,m2∈{0,1,2...M−1}
m1∈G(m)
m2∈G(m′)
Tm1,m2 +
∑
m1,m2∈{1,2...M−1}
m1 6∈G(m)∪G(m′)
m2∈G(m′)
Tm1,m2

 .
(4.5)
The first terms in each of the braces are negatives of each other and consist of the KmKm′ terms.
The second terms in each of the braces are independent of all the other terms and have mean zero,
and thus do not contribute to the calculation of the expectation. Thus,
E
[
ΓCm(T )Γ
C
m′(T )
]
= −KmKm′ .
To make this calculation more transparent, we can illustrate this computation in the case of Figure
4.3 and compute E
[
ΓC1 (T )Γ
C
2 (T )
]
. Since there are only two GCMs in this case, the second sum in
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each of the braces in (4.5) vanishes, and we have that
E
[
ΓC1 (T )Γ
C
2 (T )
]
= E [{T2,1 + T2,3 + T2,4 + T5,1 + T5,3 + T5,4}
×{T1,2 + T1,5 + T3,2 + T3,5 + T4,2 + T4,5}]
= −3× 2 = −6.
Using these results, we are able to write the covariance matrix as
Σ = MD − S (4.6)
(with M being the number of nodes in the network), where
D =

K1 0 . . . 0
0 K2 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . KG

S =

K1K1 K1K2 . . . K1KG
K2K1 K2K2 . . . K2KG
...
...
. . .
...
KGK1 KGK2 . . . KGKG

.
In Appendix C, we show that the inverse of the covariance matrix is
Σ−1 = M−1

1
K1
+ 1 1 . . . 1
1 1K2 + 1 . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . 1KG + 1

(4.7)
With these calculations, we can determine how the probability P{R(T ) ≥ L} behaves as L
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tends to infinity. This probability has the following explicit form:
P{R(T ) ≥ L} =
∫
y∈DL
f(y)dy = LG
∫
y∈D1
f(Ly)dy, (4.8)
where the density function f(y) has the explicit form:
f(y) =
1
(2pi)G/2
√
det Σ
exp
[
−1
2
yTΣ−1y
]
y ∈ RG (4.9)
and where for each ` > 0,
D` def= {y ∈ RG : max
m∈G
ym ≥ `}.
Using the Laplace principle (see Appendix B), we derive the limit:
lim
L→∞
1
L2
lnP{R(T ) ≥ L} = −β (4.10)
where11
β
def
= inf
y∈D1
1
2
yTΣ−1y. (4.11)
We can explicitly compute β in (4.11) by using the inverse of the covariance matrix, Σ−1. For
any nonnegative integer K, define the minimum distance between M/2 and K as
DM (K)
def
=
∣∣∣∣M2 −K
∣∣∣∣ .
Then (see Appendix D for details), we obtain
β = min
m∈G
2
M2 − 4D2M (Km)
=
2
M2 − 4D2M (Km∗)
(4.12)
11Equations (4.10) and (4.11) still hold when the zero-mean condition fails, i.e., when µij
def
= E[Tij ] is nonzero. We
then have that
P{R(T ) ≥ L} =
∫
y∈DL
f(y − µ)dy =
∫
y∈DL
f(y)
f(y − µ)
f(y)
dy
Since there is a γ > 0 such that
1
γ
≤ f(y − µ)
f(y)
≤ γ
for all y ∈ RG (which uses the fact that the µi’s are bounded), the asymptotics of (4.10) again holds.
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where Km∗ corresponds to the GCM
12 with a client clearing pool that minimizes (4.12). For every
m ∈ {1, 2 . . . G}, then, Km < M , so DM (Km) < M/2. Thus, all of the terms over which the search
for the minimizer of (4.12) is conducted are positive, and hence β is positive. For simplicity, we
define
βL = −L−2 lnP {R(T ) ≥ L} (4.13)
for any positive number L.
Given the results above, we have the following fundamental result, with details provided in
Appendices C and D.
Proposition 4.4.1. Assume that there is a central clearing network with M participants or nodes
(one of which is a CCP), the trading exposures between any two counterparties before being cleared
are distributed independently and identically, and follow a standard Gaussian distribution. Further-
more, assume that there are G GCMs, and that GCM m clears Km clients (one of which is itself ).
Then
lim
L→∞
βL = β,
where βL is given by (4.13) and β is given by (4.12).
To illustrate, we return to the example presented in Section 3. Since M = 6, K1 = 3 and
K2 = 2, we have that the distances DM for the two GCMs are
DM (K1) = |3− 3| = 0 and DM (K2) = |3− 2| = 1.
So, substituting these values into (4.12), we have that
β = min
{
2
36− 0 ,
2
36− 4
}
= min
{
1
18
,
1
16
}
=
1
18
.
Thus, for large L in the network of Section 3, we have that
P {R(T ) ≥ L}  exp [−(1/18)L2] .
12There could be more than one GCM that minimizes (4.12).
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For this example, the distribution of R(T ) is a zero-mean, bivariate normal random vector.
More specifically,
D =
3 0
0 2
 , S =
9 6
6 4

and the covariance matrix is
Σ = MD − S =
 9 −6
−6 8
 .
Hence, the probability P {R(T ) > L} is given by a double integral, the values of which are
presented for different levels of L in Table 4.1.13 As shown in the table, the error between βL and
β decreases as L increases and is approximately 20% at L = 15; that is, (0.0665−0.0556)/0.0556 =
0.196 ≈ 0.20. Figure 4.4 presents a plot that shows the convergence of βL to its limit as L grows.14
L P {R(T ) > L} βL
1 0.6990 0.3581
2 0.4876 0.1796
3 0.3027 0.1328
4 0.1698 0.1108
5 0.0863 0.0980
6 0.0397 0.0896
7 0.0165 0.0838
8 0.0062 0.0795
9 0.0021 0.0762
10 0.0006 0.0737
11 0.0002 0.0716
12 4.27× 10−5 0.0699
13 9.49× 10−6 0.0684
14 1.90× 10−6 0.0672
15 3.44× 10−7 0.0662
Table 4.1: The values of P {R(T ) > L} and βL for different levels of L, where the theoretical value
of β is 1/18 ≈ 0.0556.
For a clearing network of size M (where M is held constant) and a given trading exposure
matrix, the rate function β is determined by the minimum distance between M/2 and Km. More
specifically, the minimum distance in (4.12) is associated with the GCM that has the most clients
13These probabilities are calculated with the software package R.
14We do not provide results for higher levels of L since the computer regards extremely small probabilities as zero.
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Figure 4.4: βL against L.
in its clearing group (i.e., the largest GCM). This shows that the decay rate β increases with
the size of the largest GCM and that larger values of β correspond to smaller probabilities that
the maximum exposure of the CCP across GCMs is large; that is, there are smaller tails for the
probability distribution of the maximum exposures confronted by the CCP. This suggests that
those central clearing networks with large GCMs would have more internalized trades and more
multilateral netting across network participants, thus resulting in a smaller probability of large
maximum exposures for the CCP.
The minimum distance between M/2 and Km captures the effects of both tiering and concen-
tration. In the example above, where the levels of tiering and concentration are fixed, the minimum
distance is associated with GCM G1, which has more clients than G2 in its clearing pool. For more
general network specifications, where the number of GCMs and clients can both vary, it is necessary
to assess the relation between the rate function β and both tiering and concentration. We address
this issue in the next section.
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4.5 Tiering and Concentration
In Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012), the notions of tiering and concentration are defined and used to
characterize the topology of a CCP clearing network. These two metrics can be used to describe
network heterogeneity.
We measure tiering as the number of clients expressed as a fraction of the size of the network
(excluding the CCP) and define tiering as
τF
def
=
|C|
M − 1 =
M − 1−G
M − 1 , (4.14)
i.e., the fraction of non-CCP counterparties that are clients.15 For each GCM m ∈ {1, 2 . . . G}, we
define the client fraction of GCM m as
sm
def
=
Km − 1
M − 1−G,
i.e., the fraction of the clients that GCM m clears. Using (4.1), we have that the sm’s all lie in the
interval [0, 1]. Given this, we can define the cumulative distribution function
F (t)
def
=
|{m ∈ {1, 2 . . . G} : sm ≤ t}|
G
t ∈ R
We note that F (0−) = 0 and that all of the sm’s are nonnegative. To define the concentration of
the network, we define a mapping Φ from F (R) (which is finite since there are at most G different
sm’s), by requiring that
Φ(F (t))
def
=
∫
s∈[0,t] sdF (s)∫
s∈[0,∞) sdF (s)
.
In other words, Φ computes the percentage of the contribution to the mean caused by each quantile
in the distribution of ordered GCM client fractions. We map Φ to [0, 1] by a piece-wise linear
15Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012) define tiering as the absolute number of clients, i.e., M − 1 − G = C. By defining
tiering as a fraction, we produce results that are invariant to the absolute size of the network.
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interpolation, and then define concentration C as
C
def
= 1− 2
∫
t∈[0,1]
Φ(s)ds. (4.15)
The concentration coefficient measures how heterogeneous the different GCMs are in terms of the
number of clients that they clear. For example, a smaller concentration coefficient means that the
GCMs have roughly the same number of clients; whereas, a larger concentration coefficient means
that most of the clients are cleared through the same GCM.16
In order to examine the relation between the rate function β and tiering and concentration, we
consider a central clearing network of 10 participants, where there is one CCP. For each possible
network topology (i.e., different ways of having 9 − G clients clear through G GCMs, where G
is allowed to vary), we compute the tiering and concentration coefficients and the rate function
β of (4.12). Table 4.2 presents the results. For each network configuration listed, we report the
number of GCMs (G) the value Km∗ that minimizes the distance between M/2 and Km (i.e., the
optimizer in (4.12)), the value of the minimum distance (DM (Km∗)), the tiering fraction (τF ),
the concentration coefficient (C), and the corresponding β (rate function). It is possible to have
network configurations in which individual GCMs have no clients. For example, configuration {1, 8}
indicates that the first GCM has no clients, while the second GCM has all seven clients.
For explicit values of the rate function β that correspond to each network configuration, we can
also derive and compute the Maximum-Exposure-at-Risk (MEaR) for a CCP at different confidence
levels. The MEaR is a VaR-like measure of maximum exposure at risk confronted by a CCP across
the network GCMs. As noted previously, international standards require that the CCP in a centrally
cleared network be able to withstand the failure of its largest counterparty. Given this, we argue
that the MEaR risk measure presented here could be used by a CCP and its supervisor to assess
whether the loss-absorbing financial resources (i.e., capital) that the CCP holds are adequate to
withstand a default by the clearing member to which it has the largest exposure in extreme, but
16There are several different measures of concentration that could be used. Here, we use a measure that is based
on a piece-wise differentiable cumulative distribution function; whereas, Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012) use a measure
that is based on a discrete probability function. As a result, the calculated level of network concentration could vary
across the different measures.
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Configuration G Km∗ DM (Km∗) τF C β MEaR(.99) MEaR(.999)
{1,8} 2 8 3 0.778 0.500 0.031 12.14 14.87
{2,7} 2 7 2 0.778 0.357 0.024 13.91 17.03
{3,6} 2 6 1 0.778 0.214 0.021 14.87 18.21
{4,5} 2 5 0 0.778 0.071 0.020 15.17 18.58
{1,1,7} 3 7 2 0.667 0.667 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,2,6} 3 6 1 0.667 0.556 0.021 14.87 18.21
{1,3,5} 3 5 0 0.667 0.444 0.020 15.17 18.58
{1,4,4} 3 4 1 0.667 0.333 0.021 14.87 18.21
{2,2,5} 3 5 0 0.667 0.333 0.020 15.17 18.58
{2,3,4} 3 4 1 0.667 0.222 0.021 14.87 18.21
{3,3,3} 3 3 2 0.667 0 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,1,1,6} 4 6 1 0.556 0.750 0.021 14.87 18.21
{1,1,2,5} 4 5 0 0.556 0.650 0.020 15.17 18.58
{1,1,3,4} 4 4 1 0.556 0.550 0.021 14.87 18.21
{1,2,2,4} 4 4 1 0.556 0.450 0.021 14.87 18.21
{1,2,3,3} 4 3 2 0.556 0.350 0.024 13.91 17.03
{2,2,2,3} 4 3 2 0.556 0.150 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,1,1,1,5} 5 5 0 0.444 0.800 0.020 15.17 18.58
{1,1,1,2,4} 5 4 1 0.444 0.700 0.021 14.87 18.21
{1,1,1,3,3} 5 3 2 0.444 0.600 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,1,2,2,3} 5 3 2 0.444 0.500 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,2,2,2,2} 5 2 3 0.444 0.200 0.031 12.14 14.87
{1,1,1,1,1,4} 6 4 1 0.333 0.833 0.021 14.87 18.21
{1,1,1,1,2,3} 6 3 2 0.333 0.722 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,1,1,2,2,2} 6 2 3 0.333 0.500 0.031 12.14 14.87
{1,1,1,1,1,1,3} 7 3 2 0.222 0.857 0.024 13.91 17.03
{1,1,1,1,1,2,2} 7 2 3 0.222 0.714 0.031 12.14 14.87
{1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2} 8 2 3 0.111 0.875 0.031 12.14 14.87
Table 4.2: Comparison of Clearing Network Topologies, with M = 10. G is the number of GCMs,
Km∗ is the minimizer (optimal) value in (4.12), DM (Km∗) is the minimum distance, τF is the level
of tiering presented in (4.14), C is the level of concentration presented in (4.15), and MEaR is the
Maximum-Exposure-at-Risk presented in (4.16).
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plausible market conditions.
The BCBS Consultative Document entitled ”Capitalization of Bank Exposures to Central Coun-
terparties” discusses the procedure for calculating a CCP’s ”hypothetical” capital requirement due
to its exposures to all of its clearing members. A CCP’s capital requirement also has implications
for the amount of capital that clearing members must hold, because a clearing member’s capital re-
quirement is positively related to the CCP’s hypothetical capital requirement. It should be pointed
out, however, that the CCP’s capital requirement would be calculated on a consistent basis for the
sole purpose of determining the capitalization for clearing members’ default fund contributions,
and would not represent the actual capital requirements for a CCP which would be set by the CCP
and its supervisor.17
The Maximum-Exposure-at-Risk at α for α ∈ (0, 1) is given by18
MEaRα = inf {L > 0 : P {R(T ) ≥ L} ≤ 1− α}
≈ inf {L > 0 : exp [−βL2] ≤ 1− α}
=
√
1
β
ln
1
1− α.
(4.16)
Table 4.2 also presents the MEaR values for confidence levels of α = 95%, α = 99%, and α = 99.9%
for each network configuration. As shown in Table 4.2, there is a monotonic negative relation
between the rate function β and MEaR at all confidence levels, reflecting the explicit formula in
(16).
As noted by Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012), the mapping between the clearing network and the
levels of tiering and concentration is not injective, which means that there can exist many network
topologies with the same levels of tiering and concentration. Our analysis, however, is specifically
focused on large exposures, and this allows us to distinguish the tail behavior between networks
with similar levels of tiering and concentration. There can exist networks with the same levels
17On pp. 15-16 of the BCBS Consultative Document, the formulas for a CCP’s hypothetical capital requirement
due its CCR exposures to all of its clearing members and the capital requirement for clearing members are presented.
The CCP’s capital requirement varies negatively with the variation margin, initial margin, and the pre-funded default
contribution of the i’th clearing member, but positively with the exposure value to the i’th clearing member before
risk mitigation is taken into account. The aggregate capital requirement for all clearing members is positively related
to the CCP’s hypothetical capital requirement.
18For α ≈ 1. The final expression in (4.16) is derived by solving for L, and using the result that − ln(a) = ln(1/a).
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of tiering and concentration, but which differ in terms of their exponential decay rates or rate
functions β. For example, Table 4.2 shows that the two network configurations given by {1, 4, 4}
and {2, 2, 5} have the same tiering and concentration but distinct values for β. This suggests that
the rate function β, in conjunction with the levels of tiering and concentration, could be used to
describe the risk of a given clearing network in terms of a CCP’s maximum exposure.
For some network configurations presented in Table 4.2, there is a positive relation between
β and tiering and concentration; for other configurations, there is a negative relation. For still
other network configurations, the relation has no definite pattern. As an example, in the network
configuration with two GCMs (and a tiering coefficient of 0.778), there is a positive relation between
concentration and β. For other configurations, this pattern does not hold. To illustrate, for the
network configuration with three GCMs (and a tiering coefficient of 0.667), as concentration falls,
β initially falls, but then rises as concentration falls to zero. For this configuration, note that β
equals a maximum value of 0.24 when concentration is at its highest and lowest points.
Figure 4.5 presents two plots of the rate function β against tiering and concentration from two
different angles using the data in Table 4.2. The three-dimensional surfaces in the two plots clearly
reveal the complexity of the relation. Overall, these results show that tiering and concentration
are insufficient statistics or measures for identifying unique decay rates. However, our results also
indicate that the β’s are informative and can be used in comparing the relative maximum-exposure
risks for a CCP across different network configurations.
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Figure 4.5: Tiering, Concentration, and β from Two Different Angles. Tiering is presented in (13),
concentration is presented in (14), and β is presented in (12).
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The relations presented here between the probability of the CCP’s largest exposure and tiering
and concentration are substantially different from those reported by Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012).
Using standard Monte Carlo simulations, they find a positive relation between tiering and the likeli-
hood of a CCP’s maximum exposure across GCMs; and, a negative relation between concentration
and the likelihood of a CCP’s maximum exposure across GCMs. Instead, we find no indication of
any monotonic relation between the rate function and tiering and concentration. The difference in
the two sets of results can probably be attributed to the very different methodological approaches
used to examine the tail behavior of the probability distribution of maximum exposures. Large
deviations theory is an analytical approach that focuses on the probabilities of rare or tail events.
In contrast, Monte Carlo simulations, such as those used in Galbiati & Sorama¨ki (2012), typi-
cally are not structured to adequately account for extreme tail behavior, unless a large deviations
approximation via importance sampling (a variance reduction method) is used in conducting the
Monte Carlo analysis (see, e.g., Pham (2010)).19
19Importance sampling is a variance reduction method that is very useful when simulating rare events or sampling
from the tails of a distribution. It involves distorting the probability measure in order to sample from the tail region
(see Brandimarte (2006, pp. 261–267)). In choosing between analytical and numerical methods, Sokal (1996) notes
that ”‘Monte Carlo is an extremely bad method; it should be used only when all alternative methods are worse.”’ The
author goes on to say that Monte Carlo methods should only be used when neither analytic methods nor deterministic
methods are workable (or efficient.)
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Appendix A
Tarski’s fixed point theorem
Tarski’s fixed point theorem claims the existence of fixed point of a order-preserving map defined on
a complete lattice. Here we specialize the version which applies to out setting. Recall the domain
we focus on is [0, p¯]
def
= {x ∈ RN : 0 ≤ xn ≤ pn} for a given vector p¯ ∈ RN . This set is equipped
with the partial order that p ≤ q if and only if pn ≤ qn for each n. Now for a given non-empty
subset D ⊂ [0, p¯], we define the supreme ∨D componentwise as
(
∨
D)n
def
= supx∈Dxn.
Clearly q ≤ ∨D for all q ∈ D. On the other hand, suppose that q ≤ u for all q ∈ D. For
each n, there is a sequence qk)k∈N such that (
∨
D)n = limk→∞ qkn; thus (
∨
D)n ≤ un, so
∨
D ≤ u.
Therefore
∨
D is well-defined.
Proposition A.0.1. Suppose that f : [0, p¯]→ [0, p¯] is an order-preserving map. Then f has a fixed
point.
Proof. Define D] : q ≤ f(q)}. Clearly zero vector is in D, and thus D is not empty. Define
u
def
=
∨
D. By the order-preserving property, q ≤ f(q) ≤ f(u) for all q ∈ D; thus f(u) is another
upper bound of D, which implies that u ≤ f(u). Using the order-preserving property again, we get
f(u) ≤ f(f(u)) so that f(u) ∈ D, which in turn gives that f(u) ≤ u. Thus u = f(u).
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Appendix B
Laplace Principle
The principle that underlies Laplace asymptotics facilitates an understanding of the asymptotics
of a sum of exponentials. For example, if we set:
IL
def
= 2e−2L
2
+ L2e−7L
2
for all L > 0, then upon rewriting this expression as:
IL = e
−2L2
{
2 + L2e−5L
2
}
,
we have that
lim
L→∞
1
L2
ln IL = −2 + lim
L→∞
1
L2
ln
{
2 + L2e−5L
2
}
= −2 = − inf{2, 7}.
In other words, the asymptotically dominant rate of decay is the smallest of the rates of the
summands. This can be extended (see Olver (1997)) to integrands. If φ is an appropriately regular
function on Rd and A is a sufficiently regular subset of Rd, then
lim
L→∞
1
L2
ln
∫
x∈A
exp
[−L2φ(x)] dx = − inf
x∈A
φ(x).
We need the following regularity conditions:
• φ is continuous;
• ∫x∈Rd e−αφ(x)dx <∞ for some α > 0;
• A = A◦; i.e., the closure of A is equal to the closure of its interior.
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We see that these conditions are satisfied in (4.8). From the explicit form of (4.9), we have that
f(Ly) = L2f(y) for all y ∈ RG.
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Appendix C
Covariance Matrix and its inverse
We want to compute the inverse of Σ in (4.6). Let’s define two G-dimensional column vectors
K =

K1
K2
...
KG

and 1 =

1
1
...
1

.
Then (4.6) can be rewritten as
Σ = MD −KKT .
We can then obtain (4.7) using the Sherman-Morrison formula.1 Namely, defining
A
def
= MD, u
def
= −K, and v def= K,
we have that A is invertible and that A−1 = M−1D−1 and 1 + vTA−1u = 1 −KT (M−1D−1)K =
1/M 6= 0. Then
Σ−1 = (A+ uvT )−1 = A−1 − A
−1uvTA−1
1 + vTA−1u
= M−1D−1 +
(M−1D−1)KKT (M−1D−1)
1−KT (M−1D−1)K
=
1
M
D−1 +
M−111TM−1
M−1
=
1
M
(
D−1 + 11T
)
,
where we use that fact that D−1K = 1. This gives us (4.7).
1The Sherman-Morrison formula states that for any n × n invertible matrix A and any n-dimensional column
vectors u and v, (A+ uvT )−1 = A−1 − (1 + vTAu)−1A−1uvTA−1, if 1 + vTA−1u is not zero.
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Appendix D
Calculation of the Rate function and
simulation
D.1 Calculation of the rate function
In this appendix, we find the exact value of β in (4.11). From (4.7) in Appendix B, we have that
β =
1
2M
inf
y∈D1
{
yTD−1y +
(
1T y
)2}
(D.1)
So
lim
|y|→∞
{
yTD−1y +
(
1T y
)2} ≥ lim
|y|→∞
yTD−1y =∞
and since D1 is closed, the infimum is attained at a minimizer y∗. Since y∗ ∈ D1, y∗m ≥ 1 for at
least one m ∈ {1, 2 . . . G}. Relabeling the GCM’s, we can assume that m = 1. Thus, we can write
β as follows. Let
D =
K1 0
0 D◦
 and 1 = (1,1◦)
(i.e., we write D and 1 in block form where the first block is one-dimensional; then 1◦ is the
G− 1-dimensional vector of 1’s). Then
β =
1
2M
inf
y≥1
B(y),
where
B(y)
def
= inf
y˜∈RG−1
{
y2
K1
+ y˜TD−1◦ y˜ +
(
y + 1T◦ y˜
)2}
for all y ∈ R.
Since B(y) is an unconstrained quadratic optimization problem, we can easily solve it. Taking
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first derivatives, the minimizer y˜∗ must satisfy
D−1◦ y˜
∗ +
(
y + 1T◦ y˜
∗)1◦ = 0.
Hence,
y˜∗ = − (y + 1T◦ y˜∗)D◦1◦. (D.2)
Taking the inner product with 1◦, we must have that
1T◦ y˜
∗ = − (y + 1T◦ y˜∗)1T◦D◦1◦.
We can directly see (recall (4.1)) that
1T◦D◦1◦ =
G∑
m=2
Km = M − 1−K1.
Thus,
1T◦ y˜
∗ = − (y + 1T◦ y˜∗) (M − 1−K1),
so in fact
1T◦ y˜
∗ = −M − 1−K1
M −K1 y.
As a result,
y + 1T◦ y˜
∗ =
1
M −K1 y
and upon reinserting this back into (D.2), we get that
y˜∗ = − y
M −K1D◦1◦.
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We now can compute B(y). We have that
B(y) =
y2
K1
+
y2
(M −K1)2 (D◦1◦)
TD−1◦ (D◦1◦)
T +
y2
(M −K1)2
=
y2
K1
+
y2
(M −K1)2 1
T
◦D◦1◦ +
y2
(M −K1)2
= y2
{
1
K1
+
M − 1−K1
(M −K1)2 +
1
(M −K1)2
}
= y2
{
1
K1
+
1
M −K1
}
= y2
{
M
K1(M −K1)
}
.
We can next compute β under the assumption that |y∗1| ≥ 1 for the extremal y∗. We have that
inf
y≥1
B(y) =
M
K1(M −K1) .
Allowing for all re-orderings of the GCM indices (i.e., allowing y∗m ≥ 1, where y∗ is the minimizer
in (D.1), for m not necessarily 1), we get that
β =
1
2
min
1≤m≤G
1
Km(M −Km) .
To finish, we can rewrite β. Completing the square, we have that
MK −K2 =
(
M
2
)2
−
(
M
2
−K
)2
= M2
{(
1
2
)2
−
(
1
2
− Km
M
)2}
for all integers K. This yields (4.12) and Proposition 4.4.1.
D.2 Simulation of β
In this section, we present two ways to estimate βL for the network configurations listed in Table
4.2. These results are presented in Table D.1 and Table D.2. In each table, the fourth and fifth
columns report the upper bound and the lower bound of βL. The sixth column in Tables D.1 and
D.2 is derived using Monte Carlo simulation; that is, denoting by A the event {R(T ) > L}, we use
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∑N
k=1 IAk/N to estimate P(A), where Ak’s are independent copies of A.
Configuration G k0 β β
(1)
L β
(2)
L βˆL
{3,6} 2 6 0.021 0.03027 0.02853 0.02871
{1,2,6} 3 6 0.021 0.03027 0.02993 0.03010
{1,1,2,5} 4 5 0.020 0.02936 0.02908 0.02915
{1,1,1,3,3} 5 3 0.024 0.03351 0.03042 0.03071
{1,1,1,2,2,2} 6 2 0.031 0.04148 0.03658 0.03662
{1,1,1,1,1,2,2} 7 2 0.031 0.04148 0.03837 0.03840
{1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2} 8 2 0.031 0.04148 0.04138 0.04140
Table D.1: The comparison between theoretical value of β and βL at L = 15, with the size of the
network M = 10.
Configuration G k0 β β
(1)
L β
(2)
L βˆL
{3,6} 2 6 0.021 0.02678 0.02615 0.02622
{1,2,6} 3 6 0.021 0.02678 0.02675 0.02683
{1,1,2,5} 4 5 0.020 0.02590 0.02588 0.02581
{1,1,1,3,3} 5 3 0.024 0.02991 0.02818 0.02822
{1,1,1,2,2,2} 6 2 0.031 0.03766 0.03492 0.03562
{1,1,1,1,1,2,2} 7 2 0.031 0.03766 0.03592 0.03611
{1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2} 8 2 0.031 0.03766 0.03766 0.03705
Table D.2: The comparison between theoretical value of β and βL at L = 20, with the size of the
network M = 10.
71
References
Bech, M. L. & Atalay, E. (2008). The topology of federal funds market. FRBNY Staff Report No.
354.
Becher, C., Millard, S. & Sorama¨ki, K. (2008). The network topology of chaps sterling. Bank of
England Working Paper No. 355.
Bliss, R. & Steigerwald, R. (2006). Derivatives clearing and settlement: A comparison of cen-
tral counterparties and alternative structures. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Economic
Perspectives.
Boss, M., Elsinger, H., Thurner, S. & Summer, M. (2004). Network topology of the interbank
market.
Brandimarte, P. (2006). Numerical Methods in Finance and Economics: A MATLAB-Based Intro-
duction, second edition, Wiley and Sons, Inc.: New Jersey.
Castre´n, O. & Kavonius, I. (2009). Balance sheet interlinkages and macro-financial risk analysis in
the euro area. ECB Working Paper No. 1124.
Ceccheti, S., Gyntelberg, J. & Hollanders, M. (2009). Central counterparties for over-the-counter
derivatives, BIS Quarterly Review 2009: 45–58.
Cohen-Cole, E., Kirilenko, A. & Patacchini, E. (2011). How your counterparty matters: Using
transaction networks to explain returns in CCP marketplaces. Working Paper.
Cont, R. & Kokholm, T. (2012). Central clearing of OTC derivatives: bilateral vs multilateral
netting. Working paper.
Cont, R. & Moussa, A.and Santos, E. (2010). Network structure and systemic risk in banking
systems. Working paper.
Dembo, A. & Zeitouni, O. (1998). Large deviations techniques and applications, Vol. 38 of Appli-
cations of Mathematics, second edn, Springer-Verlag, New York.
Duffie, D. & Zhu, H. (2011). Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty risk?, Review
of Asset Pricing Studies 1(1): 74–95.
Eisenberg, L. & Noe, T. (2001). Systemic Risk in Financial Systems,Management Science, Vol. 47,
No. 2(Feb., 2001), pp. 236-249
72
Farooq, A. & Christerpherson, C. (2010). Interbank overnight interest rates–gain from systemic
importance. Norges Bank Working Paper 11/2010.
Galbiati, M. & Sorama¨ki, K. (2012). Clearing networks. J. Econ. Behav. Organ..
Garrett, R., Mahadeva, L. & Svirydenska, K. (2011). Mapping systemic risk in the international
banking network. Bank of England Working Paper No. 413.
Glasserman, P., Kang, W. & Shahabuddin, P. (2007). Large deviations in multifactor portfolio
credit risk, Mathematical Finance 17(3): 345–379.
Haene, P. & Sturm, A. (2009). Optimal central counterparty risk management. Swiss National
bank, Working Paper.
Hasenpusch, T. (2009). Clearing Services for Global Markets, Cambridge University Press, New
York.
Heijmans, R., Heuver, R. & Walrage, D. (2011). Monitoring the unsecured interbank money market
using target2 data. DNB Working Paper No. 276.
Iori, G., de Massi, G., Precup, O., Gabbi, G. & Caldarelli, G. (2008). A network analysis of the
italian overnight money market.
Jackson, J. & Manning, M. (2007). Comparing the pre-settlement risk implications of alternative
clearing arrangements. Bank of England Working Paper 321.
Jiang, X., Lim,L., Yao, Y. & Ye, Y. (2011). Learning to Rank with Combinatorial Hodge Theory.
Mathematical Programming, Series B, 127:203-244.
Moser, J. (1998). Contracting innovations and the evolution of clearing and settlement methods at
future exchange. Working Paper Series WP-98-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Knott, R. & Mills, A. (2002). Modelling risk in central counterparty clearing houses: a review.
Financial Stability Review, Bank of England.
Olver, F. W. J. (1997). Asymptotics and special functions, A K Peters Ltd., Wellesley, MA. Reprint
of the 1974 original [Academic Press, New York; MR 55 #8655].
Pham, H. (2007). Some applications and methods of large deviations in finance and insurance,
Paris-Princeton Lectures on Mathematical Finance 2004, Vol. 1919 of Lecture Notes in Math.,
Springer, Berlin, pp. 191–244.
Pham, H. (2010). Large deviations in mathematical finance. Working paper.
Pirrong, C. (2011). The economics of central clearing: Theory and practice. ISDA Discussion Paper
Series, No. 1.
Rordam, K. B. & Bech, M. L. (2008). The topology of Danish interbank money flows. FRU Working
Papers 2009/01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Finance Research Unit.
Seneta, E.(1981 ). Non-negative matrices and Markov chains. 2nd rev. ed., Softcover Springer
Series in Statistics (Originally published by Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1973)
73
Siddique, A. (2012). Counterparty Credit Risk and Other Risk-Coverage Measures, Vol. Basel III
and Beyond, RiskBooks, chapter 5.
Singh, M. (2010). Collateral, netting and systemic risk in the OTC derivatives market. IMF
Working Paper, WP/10/99.
Sokal, A. (1996). Monte carlo methods in statistical mechanics: Foundations and new algorithms,
Lectures at the Cargese Summer School.
Tumpel-Gugerell, G. (2010). Recent Advances in Modelling Systemic Risk using Network Analysis,
European Central Bank, pp. 5–7. Opening remarks.
Wetherilt, A., Zimmerman, P. & Sorama¨ki, K. (2009). The sterling unsecured loan market during
2006-2008: insights from network theory. Bank of England Working Paper No. 398.
74
